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ABSTRACT 
Security interests in consumer goods have been extensively 
regulated, this regulation taking the principal forms either of 
prohibiting creditors from taking such interests at all or of 
deliberately reducing their attractiveness as risk reduction 
devices. The unique feature of this consumer protection regulation 
is that it is not justified by the usaal unconscionability reasons, 
such as the existence of imperfect information, but rather by the 
view that security disadvantages consumers even though the contracts 
that create it may not be unconscionable. In particular, the 
institutional structure is considered to create incentives for 
secured creditors not to maximize the proceeds that repossessed 
collateral could yield, with the result that consumers remain 
liable for excessive debts even after foreclosure. Also, creditors 
are said to threaten repossession unfairly to coerce payment; 
repossession allegedly destroys consumer surplus; and it 
supposedly violates debtors' rights. This paper argues that 
these justifications for the regulation of security interests in 
consumer goods are untenable or unpersuasive. Contracts to give 
security actually pose problems similar in kind to those posed by 
any other consumer contract, and should be regulated, if at all, 
under the same rationales. 
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Con sumers who grant security interests to creditors pay lower 
interest rates in return, but this seemingly innocuous arrangement has 
recently been regulated extensiveiy. For example, the Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code authori zes courts to refuse to enforce certain 
security interests if enforcement would impose "undue hardship" on the 
consumer.1 Several states also prohibit creditors who foreclose from 
later suing for deficien cy judgments,2 in which they attempt to 
recover the difference between the unpaid debt and the amount realized 
on foreclosure. This prohibition reduces the attractiveness of 
security as a risk reduction device. In addition, proposals have been 
made to prevent creditors from taking security interests in consumer 
goods collateral except for purchase money security interests.3 
Contracts made between competent and informed persons in 
competitive markets, it is assumed here, are presumptively 
enforceable. This is because such contracts maximize the utility of 
the parties to them, and 
_
commonly social utility as well.4 Also, most 
nonutilitarian moral schemes accord free an d autonomous person s the 
right to make en forceable contracts.5 If the general enforceability 
of contracts is assumed, two types of reasons may justify regulating 
contracts to give security. First, are reason s following from the 
failure of the presuppositions on which the "enforceability 
assumption " rests. When consumers are incompetent or unin formed, or 
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markets behave noncompetitively, regulation of consumer transactions 
usually is justifiable.6 Reasons to regulate drawn from the failure 
of the presuppositions on which the enforceability assumption rests 
are called "contract law reasons." As an example of their application 
in this context, a court could use the unconscionability doctrine to 
strike down a broad security interest clause that is written in fine 
print and arcane legal language.7 Although no contract law reasons to 
support nonenforcement may exist, other reasons of fairness or utility 
also may require regulation in particular cases. A second set of 
reasons justifying the regulation described above thus may derive from 
the peculiar nature of security interests in consumer goods. 
Individuals, that is, may be unjustifiably disadvantaged by the giving 
of security in ways that do not disadvantage business debtors. This 
second set of reasons has been most influential in actually causing 
decisionmakers to regulate security interests in consumer goods, and 
is the subject of this paper.8 
The reasons in this second s�t are: (i) Secured creditors are 
said systematically not to maximize the value obtained on resale of 
the collateral because these creditors can sue for deficiency 
judgments. For example, if the unpaid debt on default is Sl, 5 00 and 
the collateral has a fair market value of Sl, 000, a secured creditor, 
it is claimed, will sell the collateral for less than Sl, 000 and sue 
for a deficiency in excess of SSOO. The Uniform Commercial Code 
prohibits this practice and gives debtors a cause of action should it 
occur.9 The UCC's sanctions, however, are said to be inadequate; 
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alternatively, consumers allegedly lack the resources or 
sophistication to use the Code's protection. In either case, further 
regulation, such as banning deficiency judgments, is thought 
necessary. (ii) Repossession "destroys value" bec.ause individual 
debtors commonly value goods in excess of their market prices but 
corporate creditors at best resell at these prices. Because 
repossession imposes greater harms on debtors than it creates gains 
for creditors, cases exist against it on both utilitarian and fairness 
grounds. (iii) Creditors seldom repossess in order to reduce the size 
of the unpaid debt with the proceeds of the collateral because these 
proceeds often are trivial. Instead, creditors take security to 
enable them to coerce payment by threats to repossess. This coercion 
sometimes causes consumers to pay dc!;ts that are neither legally nor 
morally owing. Such "in terrorem repossessions" are wrongful. lo (iv) 
Enforcing broad security interests may violate some inalienable right 
of debtors to retain the property at issue. An untrammeled power to 
repossess could enable creditors to de�rive persons of goods that may 
be necessary to their leading of full and autonomous lives. Because 
people have a right to lead such lives, security can violate their 
rights. This property rights theme is more hinted at than discussed 
but seems an important influence. It apparently explains such 
justifications for regulation as that full enforcement of security 
interests in consumer durables "would cause too great a personal 
hardship. ,,ll 
Some of these reasons for regulation would be unpursuasive if 
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consumers were perfectly informed respecting the strategies that 
creditors pursue. For example, if consumers knew that some creditors 
would not maximize the value of repossessed collateral, and if 
consumers could conveniently monitor creditor promises to maximize, 
creditors would have an incentive to make such pr omises. The market 
could cause creditors to compete along the dimension of transaction 
fairness, as well as along the more familiar dimensions of price and 
quality. Consumers, however, are not perfectly informed about 
creditor strategies. This paper thus assumes that the only post­
default creditor strategy of which consumers are aware is that secured 
creditors will repossess; 1 2  the paper then argues that even given such 
limited knowledge, the four reasons just set forth cannot justify 
regulating security interests. The law applicable to security 
interests in consumer goods should therefore be drawn from contract 
law doctrines. The practical importance of this conclusion is that 
contract theories suggest a different form of regulation than is now 
used. For example, unconscionability decisions traditionally are made 
case by case. Alternatively, a legislature might choose to regulate 
security in the way warranties are now often regulated; that is, it 
may attempt to create conditions that help ensure the existence of 
security agreements that benefit both parties to them by, for example, 
permitting enforcement only of those security interest clauses that 
are set forth in "clear and conspicuous" language.13 Broad statutory 
prohibitions, however, such as those banning deficiency judgments, are 
justifiable only by the second set of reasons just summarized; because 
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these reasons are unpersuasive, prohibitions of this sort should not 
be used. 
Part I briefly describes the principal legal limitations on 
the taking of security. Part II shows that creditors have incentives 
to maximize the proceeds from resale, and that the scanty available 
evidence suggests that they do so. Part III argues that no value is 
lost through repossession or that value is merely transferred; if 
either outcome occurs, the "value destruction" case against security 
falls. Part IV next argues that in terrorem repossessions are less 
common than is generally supposed, and that they are not objectionable 
when their effect is understood. Finally, Part V argues that the 
moral theories underlying the objection that security violates 
persons' property rights may accord people rights to things but cannot 
sustain present limitations on the power of people to mortgage those 
things. In consequence of these arguments, this paper concludes that 
contracts to give security interests in consumer goods pose only the 
problem that consumer contracts generally pose, which is that the 
consent of consumers to them sometimes may not be fully free.14 
I. THE LAW 
Section 9 -5 07(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that 
"every aspect of the disposition [ci collateral by the secured 
c reditor] including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be 
commercially reasonable." Resale "may be by public [i.e. auction] or 
private proceedings"; in either case, "reasonable notification'' of the 
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sale must be sent to the debtor. The secured party is liable to the 
debtor for "any loss" caused by a failure to comply with Article 9. 
Also, if the collateral is consumer goods, the Code imposes a penalty 
on a creditor who fails to resell in a commercially reasonable manner, 
independently of whether the consumer debtor suffered loss: the 
noncomplying creditor is liable for "the credit service charge plus 
ten percent of the principal amount of the debt • • •  plus ten percent 
of the cash price.•1 5  
These Article 9 rules respond only to one of the grounds that 
could justify regulation of security interests in consumer goods, that 
creditors systematically fail to maximize the collateral' s value. The 
rules, however, may be thought not to create sufficient incentives for 
creditors to maximize. This is partly because section 9-5 07(2) 
provides that a sale cannot be found unreasonable just because "a 
better price could have been obtained by a sale at a different time or 
in a different method"; rather, the price obtained is only one of the 
factors relevant to ascertaining reasonableness. This latitude could 
make it difficult for a debtor to prove that his creditor actually 
made a nonmaximizing resale. In addition, many consumers may lack the 
resources and sophistication to police compliance with Article 9. 
Largely in consequence of these felt difficulties, courts have 
insisted on strict compliance with Article 9 procedures, in particular 
the notice of resale requirement, and have created their own sanctions 
to deter creditor misbehavior. The principal sanctions are: (a) in 
some states, to deny a deficiency judgment to a creditor who fails to 
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comply with the Code; 1 6 (b) in other states, to impose on the 
noncomplying creditor the burden of proving that the collateral 
actually was worth less than the unpaid debt.1 7  A creditor who cannot 
show that the collateral was worth less than the unpaid debt has no 
grounds on which to claim a deficiency. In addition, courts 
occasionally require creditors to explain large differences between 
resale prices and the collaterals' apparent value, even when a debtor 
fails to prove creditor noncompliance with the statute.1 8  
These judicial additions to Article 9 respond only partially 
to the concerns that underlie the "failure to maximize justification" 
for limiting the ability of consumers to grant security. For example, 
suppose that a group of automobile dealers in a given locality agrees 
to sell repossessed cars to each other at less, but not excessively 
less, than fair market value; however, when each dealer repossesses, 
he gives his debtor the requisite Article 9 notice and otherwise 
apparently complies with the statute. Few consumer debtors have the 
resources to prove that such a cartel exists yet without such proof 
the judicial sanctions just set out could not be imposed. Also, 
Article 9, even as supplemented by the courts, is not at all 
responsive to the concerns that commercially reasonable resales can 
destroy value, be used for in terrorem purposes or violate persons' 
property rights. Additicnal regulation of security interests in 
consumer goods thus seems necessary and exists. 
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code limits sellers to the taking 
of purchase money security interests, which secure the unpaid portion 
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of the sales price.1 9  Also, when this price is Sl,7 5 0  or less, the 
creditor is put to an election; if he repossesses, he cannot sue for a 
deficiency while if he foregoes repossession to sue on the debt, he 
cannot attach the goods in which he has a security interest.2 0  
Finally, the UCCC authorizes courts t o  prevent enforcement of a 
security interest that a lender takes in household goods if 
nonenforcement "is necessary to avoid undue hardship for the consumer 
or a member of a family • • •  supported by him."2 1  Other states 
regulate more simply. California bans deficiencies in sales finance 
transactions for aut omobiles;2 2  Washington bans deficiencies in all 
sales finance transactions but not for loans;23 and New Mexico bans 
deficiencies altogether in consumer credit transactions.2 4  In 
addition, the Federal Trade Commission recently developed a proposed 
Trade Regulation Rule that would prevent creditors from taking 
security in household goods, except purchase money security.2 5  This 
Rule would also ban deficiency judgments in connection with purchase 
money security unless "the debtor is credited with the fair market 
retail value of the collateral as determined by a sale in an 
established retail market."2 6  
These rules respond in different ways to the four 
justifications for regulation set forth above. Banning security is 
responsive to all of them. Banning deficiency judgments responds to 
the first justification, that creditors fail to maximize the proceeds 
obtained on foreclosure, because it limits creditors to these 
proceeds, and thus creates a strong incentive for creditors to 
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maximize them. The proposed Federal Trade Commission Rule also 
responds to the failure to maximize justification. This is because 
fair market retail value is the most the collateral could yield; 
requiring creditors to reduce the outstanding debt by this value 
creates an incentive for creditors actually to obtain it. The ban on 
deficiency judgments also discourages the taking of security when the 
collateral is worth little in relation to the debt. It is in this 
case, it is shown below, that the latter three justifications seem 
most compelling.2 7  
Article 9 apparently responds intelligently to the occasional 
cases of creditor venality or sloth that will inevitably arise. The 
judicial additions to it and the recent statutory and administrative 
regulation just described presuppose the validity of one or more of 
the four justifications for regulation listed above. It is to these 
justifications that attention must be paid. 
II. CREDITORS DO NOT FAil. TO MAXIMIZE 
Many items are repossessed and resold each year. Because 
persons sometimes are careless or lazy, some of these items would be 
sold at less than their best price even if creditors sought to 
maximize resale proceeds. This fact cannot support the legal reforms 
just described because any system is subject to occasional human 
errors. Supporters of these reforms thus must make the stronger claim 
either that factors exist that systematically prevent secured 
creditors from maximizing resale proceeds although they want to do so 
1 0  
or that secured creditors have incentives not to maximize. No 
systematic factors seemingly prevent creditors from maximizing if they 
choose to do so. Perhaps because of this. reformers claim that 
creditors have no incentive to maximize and that the evidence 
indicates that nomnaximizing resales are common. Part II shows that 
it would be irrational of secured creditors wishing to maximize 
profits to fail to maximize resale proceeds so long as each creditor 
does not act in concert with other creditors. A failure to maximize 
is a profitable strategy for creditors only if creditor cartels are 
assumed. Part II goes on to argue that creditor cartels to depress 
the resale prices of collateral are unlikely to exist. Before 
reaching the justification of these conclusions, it is worth stressing 
what claim actually is to be made below and the "deeper" assumptions 
on which this claim rests. The claim is that profit maximizing 
creditors have incentives to maximize resale proceeds and to eschew 
cartels. The deeper assumptions on which it rests. neither of which 
is defended here, are: (i) creditors act as if they attempt to 
maximize profits or, what is the same thing, share values, and (ii) by 
and large, people act effectively in pursuit of their goals, which 
means here that creditors will maximize resale proceeds if maximizing 
would be their most profitable strategy. 
A. Creditor Incentives 
The Federal Trade Commission Staff Report on the Proposed 
Trade Regulation Rule described above concisely summarized the claim 
1 1  
that creditors systematically fail to maximize: 
The creditor does not necessarily have an incentive to obtain the 
highest possible price for the collateral. There are a number of 
reasons for this. including [l] the fact that Article 9 of the 
UCC which requires that any surplus be repaid to the consumer 
imposes a ceiling on the return available to a creditor in a 
repossession sale. [ 2] At the same time, the fact that a 
deficiencies [sic] can be collected from consumers in many cases 
tends to mitigate any necessity of maximizing the repossession 
sales price. [3] Moreover, any loss to a creditor in the form of 
an uncollected deficiency is mitigated by immediate tax benefits 
which tend to reduce the amount of the actual loss by 5 0  
percent.2 8  
The report explained, in connection with the second reason given: 
In the area of high priced collateral, creditors will invest in a 
repossession sales effort only to a point where the net return 
from the repossession sale equals the net return from resources 
invested in the collection of deficiencies. Thus, where the 
right to collect deficiencies exists, a lesser sales effort is a 
reasonable expectation.2 9  
Respecting the first of these reasons. creditors do lack a n  incentive 
to maximize the surplus�the excess of the collateral's resale price 
over the unpaid debt�because the surplus accrues to debtors. The 
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perceived problem that prompted the l egal reforms de scribed above, 
however, was not that re sal e s  generated insuffici ent surpluses; a 
surplus is rare when consumer goods are resold. Decisionmakers were 
instead concerned w ith the po ssib i l i ty that nonmaximiz ing resal e s  
increa sed the def ic iencies that consumers had to pay. Moreover, if 
creditors actually do maximiz e the proceeds rece ived from resold 
coll ateral when its value equal s or is less than the out standing debt, 
the problem of insufficient surpluses should vanish. This is because 
creditors commonly set up systems whereby repo sse ssed col lateral is 
sold. If these systems are de signed to maximiz e resal e proceeds, 
because the collateral commonly is worth l e s s  than the unpaid debt, 
the occasional surplus w ill al so be maximiz ed; for it seems irrational 
of creditors to expend the resource s ne cessary to identify coll ateral 
l ikely to bring a surplus and then to vary the standard routine only 
for the purpose of reducing the surplus . Whil e  creditors, that is,  
have no incentive to maximiz e the value of surpluses simpl iciter, they 
al so have no incentive to vary standard practice sol ely to 
di sadvantage consumers. Thus, where standard practice i s  to maximize, 
surpluse s  al so are l ikely to be maximiz ed. 
When the collateral will bring l e s s  than the unpaid debt, 
standard practice allegedly is not to maximiz e because of the 
availabil ity of def ic iency j udgment s, the se cond reason the FIC s taff 
gave, but this reason is fal se .  If se cured creditors maximiz e  prof its 
and do not act in concert with other creditors, each cr editor must do 
worse by not maximiz ing resal e value than by maximiz ing it. An 
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example make s thi s point. 
Suppo se a secured creditor sel l s  a new car to a debtor who 
make s several payment s and defaul ts. Let the unpaid debt be S5 , 000; 
the value a maximiz ing resal e of Llca car would bring be S3 , 000; the 
value of a nonmaximiz ing resal e be Sl,500; the probabil ity, as 
observed by the creditor, that the debtor w ill be come (or is)  
insolvent be twenty percent ( .2) . Also, suppo se the creditor would 
col lect s.12 on the dol l ar if the debtor did be come insolvent and 
entered insolvency proceedings, 3 0  and that the discount rate is z ero-­
to the creditor, a dollar received in six months i s  worth as much as a 
dollar received today. What is the expected value to the creditor of 
maximiz ing the proceeds of resale? And what i s  the expected value of 
not maximiz ing? 
1 .  Maximiz e 
Total Expe cted Recovery=83 , 000 ( from resal e )  + 
.8 ( 82 , 000) ( expected value of def ic iency j udgment if 
col lected in ful l) + 
.2 ( 82 , 000 x .12) ( expected value of def ic i ency j udgment if 
debtor goe s  bankrupt ) =S4, 648 . 
2 .  Don' t Maximiz e 
Total Expected Recovery=81, 5 00 ( from resal e) + 
.8 ( 83 ,500) + 
.2 ( 83 ,5 00 x .12) =S4,384 . 
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The exampl e shows that the expected value to the creditor of 
fail ing to maximize the car' s resal e value is S264 l e s s  than the 
expected value of maximiz ing it. A proof in the appendix general iz es 
thi s  exampl e; 3 1  whenever the probabil ity that the debtor w il l  go 
bankrupt i s  positive (greater than z ero) , the expected value of 
fail ing t o  maximize the proceeds of resal e is always l e s s  than the 
expe cted value of maximizing. Al so, the exampl e supposed the discount 
rate to be z ero but thi s is fal se; a dollar rece ived today is worth 
more than a dollar rece ived in six months because the dol lar rece ived 
today can be invested in a riskl e s s  asset such as a Trea sury bill that 
yields a sure return. Suppo se then, in the example above, that a 
creditor can collect a def iciency j udgment no sooner than three months 
after resal e of the collateral; that he can col lect in insolvency 
proceedings no sooner than six months after resale; and that the 
interest or discount rate i s  8 percent .  Then the expected value of 
fail ing to maximize i s  S289 .96 less than the expected value of 
maximiz ing . 
These exampl e s  suppo se collection co sts to be z ero for ease of 
exposition. The FTC staff ' s expl anation ci ted above, that creditors 
will compare the costs and gains of vari ous col lect ion dev ice s, 
correctly focuse s  attention on cost s, but the conclus ions based on 
these exampl e s  are unl ikely to change if the z ero cost assumpt ion is 
relaxed. To see why, suppo se, again for ease of analysi s, that the 
creditor' s f ixed cost i s  z ero; his marginal col l ection costs are 
constant at S .20 per dollar col l ected on resale, but only S.10 per 
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dol lar coll ected in a def iciency act ion or in a bankruptcy proceeding; 
and that each party bears his own attorney' s fees.  These exampl e s  are 
meant to make resale tw ice as costly as a suit for a def ici ency. The 
f irst exampl e above, with the discount rate at z ero. becom e s :  
1 .  Maximiz e :  
Total Expected Recovery= ( S3 , 000-S600 cost of resal e )  + 
.s CS2 , ooo debt plus S600 resale cost s recoverable in 
def ic iency act ion -
S260 c o st of col lect ing def iciency) + 
.2 C S2 , 6 00 x . 12-S31 .20 co�·: of col lecting 
in bankruptcy)=S4 , 3 60 . 16 
2. Don' t Maximiz e :  
Total Expected Recovery=S4 , 3 22 .08 
When it is twice as expensive to resell than to col lect a def ic iency, 
the expected value of maximiz ing still exceeds the expected value of 
not maximizing by S38 .08 . In f act, the cost of col lect ing def ici ency 
j udgments i s  l ikely to exceed the cost of repo sse ssion and resal e 
because foreclosure often can be done quickly by sal aried employees, 
without the nece ssity for paying counsd or court cost s or waiting to 
col lect the money. Thus the basic conclusion is unaffected by 
considering cost s; it always pays creditors to maximiz e . 3 2  
The se exampl e s  al so illustrate the error o f  the third reason 
the FTC Staff gave to expl ain why creditors woul d not maximiz e, that a 
creditor' s concern over an unpaid def ic iency j udgment is mitigated by 
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his abil ity to deduct bad debt losse s .  In the second exampl e above, 
where the discount rate was po sitive, the expected after tax loss to 
the creditor who maximiz e s  the proceeds of resale, suppo sing a 
marginal corporate tax rate of 44 percent, is S213 .37 CS5 , 000 unpaid 
debt l e s s  S4 ,618 .99 , the expected value of col lection, leaves an 
expected tax deduction of S381 .0l, which w ith a 44 percent marginal 
tax rate impo se s on the creditor an after tax loss of .56 x the 
deduct ion) . The expected after tax loss to the credi tor who does not 
maximiz e is higher--S379 .74. a difference of Sl62 .37 . This resul t i s  
not surprising because the effect o f  the tax i s  to enable a corporate 
creditor to keep S .5 6  of every dol lar it earns, and to bene f it by S.56 
from every dollar it deduc t s, suppo sing i t  to have income. Thus the 
creditor cannot gain by forego ing income, which l o se s  it S .5 6  per 
dol lar, in order to increase deductions. for the se gain it only S.56 
per dollar. A creditor therefore w ill regard the availabil ity of tax 
deductions as irrelevant to its decision whether to maximiz e or not .33 
B. Wholesale Sales 
Financial creditors such as banks and f inance compani e s  
frequently sel l repo sse ssed coll ateral in whol e sale rather than retail 
marke ts. Because retail sal e s  generate higher returns, the pract ice 
of whol e sal ing repo s se s sions is thought to di sadvantage consumer s. 
Moreover, the practice of some creditors to make whol e sale sal e s  when 
retail marke ts are availabl e is considered strong evidence in support 
of the claim that creditors systematical ly fail to maxim ize the value 
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of repo sse ssed col lateral .3 4  In consequence of these v iews, propo sal s 
have been made to require or encourage retail sal e s  in all case s .  An 
e xampl e of such a propo sal is the FTC' s suggested rule that would 
permit whol e sale sal e s  but require f inancers to credi t consumers w ith 
the amount that actual good faith retail sal e s  would bring. 3 5  The 
Commission staff apparently thought their rul e woul d work in the 
f ol l ow ing way: Let a bank repo s se s s  a car on which SS,000 is owed and 
sell the car to a dealer for S4 , 000 . The dealer reta i l s  the car for 
S6, 000 . Under the propo sed rul e, the bank must credit the debtor w ith 
the amount that the retail sal e  brought�S6, 000�and thus could sue 
only for a S2 , 000 deficiency . Since the bank would then incur a 
s2.ooo loss. banks are l ikely to sell at retail if the rul e is pa ssed. 
Whether they do or not, consumers w ill bene f it because they wil l be 
l iable for l ower def iciencies.  
The exampl e s  in Part II A above showed that credi tor s always 
do be tter by maximiz ing resale proce eds. Consumer s do be tter as wel l ,  
be cause a maximiz ing resale redv>e�. the def ici ency that the debtor 
owes. In the exampl e j ust used, however, a bank chose to re sel l at 
whol e sale, recovering S4 , 000 , rather than at retail, whereby S6, 000 
could have been obtained. This exampl e doe s  not refute the analysis 
above when re sal e cost s are considered. Part II B next shows, ·  through 
a more careful analysis of this example, that a prof it maximizing 
f inancer probably woul d want to whol e sale his repo sse ssions. 
It i s  be st to begin by focusing on the difference be tween the 
whol e sale and retail price s--the s2 . ooo pr emium in the illustration 
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above. This premium has two el ement s :  ( i) the cost of putting a 
repo sse ssed car in shape for resale; ( ii) a payment to the retail 
dealer, including the dealer' s prof it, for the service of running a 
retail busine ss. Part of the premium, that is, helps the dealer 
defray the cost s of a showroom or sal e s  l ot, a repair capabil ity and 
sal e s  personnel, and provide s a return on the capital invested in the 
busine ss. Since the retail dealer cannot conduct his busine ss unl ess 
he i s  abl e  to buy at whole sale, a portion of the def ici ency j udgment-­
S2 , 000 hercr-actual ly supports the retail facility. 
Suppose that the bank, in this il lustration, instead retailed 
its repo sse ssions. To do so , it would need a retail facil ity. If the 
bank had the same retail costs as the de aler and resold for S6, 000 , it 
would be able to sue for a S4 . 000 deficiency under the Code, 
calculated as fol lows: Def iciency = unpaid debt (SS, 000) - proceeds 
of resal e (S6, 000) + co sts of resale CS2 ,000) ) = S4, 000 . To deny the 
bank the $2,000 in resale costs woul d be to require it to provide a 
retail facil ity for fre e .3 6  Thus if banks and de alers could retail 
cars at equal cost, both banks and consumers would be indifferent to 
whether banks whol e saled or retail ed; either method woul d generate the 
same def iciency. 
Deal ers, however, commonly can retail repo sse ssed cars at l e s s  
cost than banks o r  f inance companie s  because f inancers have expertise 
in the l ending busine ss but not in the sell ing used goods busine ss, 
while dealers commonly have the reverse compe tencies.3 7  When the 
f inancer' s  cost disadvantage is considered, the error of encouraging 
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f inancers to be come retailers becomes apparent . Suppo se that it woul d 
cost the bank in the illustration above s2 .200 to retail the car 
rather than the $2 , 000 it costs the de aler. A retail sal e then woul d 
ne t the f inancer S3 ,SOO�S6, 000 in proceeds l e s s  S2 ,200 in cost s. A 
whol e sale, however, ne ts S4 , 000 . Thus when f inancers are l e s s  
efficient retailers than de al ers, which often seems the c a s e ,  a 
whol e sale sale is value maximiz ing . Because this is so, the common 
practice of f inancers to make whol e sale sal e s  cannot count a s  evidence 
in support of the cl aim that creditors systematica l ly fail to maximiz e 
the value of repo sse s se d  collateral . In addi tion. efforts such as 
those of the FIC' s staff to coerce f inancers to retail reposse ssions 
woul d di sadvantage debtors by incr easing the def iciencies for which 
debtors would be l iabl e .  I n  the illustration above, the def ic iency 
would increase from S4 , 000 to $4 ,200 were the FTC rul e to apply. 
To summarize the argument to this point, se cured creditors who 
wish to maximiz e prof its and who do not act in concert with other 
creditors always will do be tter by maximiz ing the proceeds from resale 
of the collateral . The common practice of f inancing creditors to 
whol e sal e repo ssessions doe s not contradict this conclusion. The 
f ailure to maximize justif ication f or l aw reform therefore must f al l  
unless carte l s  exi st. 
C. Cartels 
Two rel ated kinds of cart�ls might exi st respect ing 
repo sse ssed goods. First. a group of de alers could agree to bid 
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collus ively on reposse ssed items offered for sale such that each 
dealer is assured a supply of low pr iced goods, which can then be 
resold at retail price s. In this circumstance, the repo sse ssing 
creditor-- suppose a bank�could actually be attempting to maximiz e the 
resale value of the collateral but be prevented from doing so by the 
deal er cartel.  " Col lusive bidding cartel s" might exist in conne ct ion 
w ith publ ic resal e s, when repo s se s sed items are sold at auction. 
Second, a group of de alers who carry their own paper or who are 
involved in recourse f inancing arrangement s38 might agree to resell 
col l ateral to each other for less than the coll ateral ' s value . For 
exampl e, suppose dealer A repo sse ssed a car worth S3 , 000 when the 
unpaid debt was SS , 000 , sold the car to dealer B for Sl,500, and sued 
for a S3 ,500 def iciency. Part I A showed that this was a l o sing 
strategy. But suppo se dealer A knew that dealer B woul d resell it a 
repo sse sed car for Sl ,500 less than its actual value shortly 
thereafter. Then dealer A' s expected loss from fail ing to maximize-­
S289 .96 in the principal exampl e above� is swamped by his expected 
gain--the l arge difference between the retail price of the car later 
to be purchased from dealer B and the low whol e sal e price that dealer 
B will exact. Because any two de al ers are unl ikely to have precisely 
matching repo s se ssion experience s, a "deal er trading cartel" such as 
thi s  would nee d  several members, al though probably fewer than the 
col lusive bidding cartel de scribed above.3 9  
Th e  gain t o  participants in both of these cartel s  comes from 
be ing abl e  to buy repo sse ssed goods at artificial ly depressed 
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whole sale pr ice s and to resel l them for ful l  retail value . Because 
banks and maj or f inance companie s  sel l  repo sse ssed goods but never buy 
them, these f inancers have no incent ive to j oin e i ther cartel .  
Indeed, the f inancers would oppose col lusive bidding carte l s  because 
these cartel s  reduce the returns from repo s se ssion sal es.  And dealer 
trading cartel s  would seldom be marke twide be cause f inancers can 
compete with dealers to f inance sal es.  The que stion i s  whether ei ther 
form of cartel can funct ion in the se c ircumstances.  
This i s  an empirical que stion that cannot be f inally answered 
on the available da ta. No persuasive evidence of the existence of 
ei ther form of cartel has been adduced, nor have any been succe ssful ly 
prosecuted. These fact s are not conclusive. Successful carte l s  
seldom are revealed by academic inquiry. Al so, academic inquiri e s  
must use publ icly available data, such as prof its and price movement s. 
Out siders cannot ea sily obtain prof it f igur es for the smal l ,  often 
privately held f irms that w il l  const itute any cartel; and actual 
transaction price s of used goods are difficult to observe. These 
problems would make hard evidence of the existence of cartel s unusual 
even if the carte l s  themselves were common. In addition, cartel s  in 
cone ction w ith the resal e of used consumer goods w ill occur-- if at 
all�in local marke ts, and state ant i trust enforcement is sel dom 
vigorous . Thus l ittle can be inferred from the absence of 
prose cutions against them. With the record in this state, the be st 
that can be done is to ask whether the industry or f irm trai ts that 
se emingly correl a te w ith col lusive behavior exist when repo sse sse d  
col lateral is resold. If these trai ts exi st in insuf f icient degree, 
as is argue d below, the burden shoul d shift to proponent s of the 
" failure to maximize" j ustif ication for law reform to prove that 
creditor cartel s  are in fact present . This is because, as shown 
above, without cartel s  such as those described here the failure to 
maximiz e j ustif ication must f al l .  The di scus sion focus e s  mainly on 
use d  car marke ts because creditor misbehavior is said to be most 
prevel ant there.40 
1 .  Collusiye Bidd ing Cartels 
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The l ikel ihood that f irms will carte l iz e  an industry varies 
inversely with the cost s to the f irms of making and pol ic ing col lusive 
arrangement s, and varies directly with the abi l ity of f irms to retain 
signif icant gains from cartel behav ior. Several more specific factors 
that seemingly correlate po sitively with the existence of carte l s  have 
been derived from the se general observations. Firms w ill incur 
rel atively lower cost s in forming a�d policing carte l s  when few firms 
exist because it is easier to make l a sting arrangement s among few than 
among many. Also, cartel costs are l ower when f irms deal in 
homogeneous goods because then the only variable on which agreement 
must be secured is the price . Respect ing the abil ity of f irms to 
retain gains from cartel behav ior, cartel members have an incentive to 
steal customers from one another by offering buyers price s below the 
high cartel price but above the competitive price; if many members act 
in this way, the cartel will di ssolve because f irms that adhere to 
23 
cartel arrangement s would have no customers. The opportuni ties for 
cheating are l ower when all sal e s  are made publ icly, so that the terms 
are observable; when f irms have l arge marke t shares. so that the 
expansion of f irm output that cheating produce s  is noticable; and 
again when product and sal e s  terms are homogeneous, so that f irms 
can.not grant diff icul t to de tect nonpecuni ary price reduct ions such as 
more extensive warranti e s. Finally, the abil ity of f irms to retain 
gains from cartel behavior is higher when entry into the industry is 
diff icul t. Were entry easy, out side f irms have a strong incentive to 
come in and steal cartel customers by undercutting the cartel ' s  price . 
The prospect of such entry could reduce the expected gain from 
carteliz ing below the expected cost; in thi s event, a cartel is 
unl ikely to be formed. 41 
These factor s  suggest that effective collusive bidding cartel s 
among dealers to depress the price s at which col lateral is resold 
should rarely exist in marke ts for reposse ssed consumer goods. One 
factor that actually doe s  increase the probabil ity of such a cartel is 
the ease with which cartel members could de te ct cheating. To see why, 
suppo se the automobile de al ers in a town agree to make low bids on the 
repo sse ssion sal e s  of the l ocal banks. Each dealer has an incentive, 
at any particular auction, to cheat by bidding an amount above the l ow  
cartel price but b e l ow  the actual whol e sale value; i n  this way, the 
dealer can buy cars at very low price s when the cartel allows him to 
be successful bidder and to buy at below marke t anyway when the cartel 
has chosen someone el se . Such cheating would be simpl e to de te ct and 
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deter because bids at resal e auctions are pub l ic .  Thus the cartel 
could discipl ine the offending de aler rel atively easily; for example, 
it could always overbid him at auctions to shut off hi s supply. The 
remaining rel evant factors. however, point against the existence of 
col lusive bidding carte l s .  
Ini tially, cartel arrangement s would be co stly t o  make . 
First. rel atively large numbers of de alers exist in many local 
marke ts; use d car sal e s, for example, are made by new car dealers and 
by used car lots. both of which commonly sell a w ide vari ety of 
model s .  Also, mo st--perhaps all�firms in a marke t must b e  members or 
a col lusive bidding cartel could not survive. This i s  because a very 
few f irms could destroy a cartel by overbidding at pub l ic auctions, 
which nonmembers woul d have a strong incentive to do. In consequence, 
a succes sful cartel woul d require the agreement of a substantial 
number of f irms, hav ing different busine ss experience s and of 
different siz e s. As an example of the difficulties f irms could 
experience in reaching agreement in. these circumstances, consider the 
problem of creating an al location, among members with different 
busine ss experience s, of the number of l ow  priced cars that each is 
ent i tled to buy per period. The existence of product heterogeniety 
will increase the cost s of reaching such an agreement . A large 
variety of repo s se s sed automobile mode l s  w ill be offered for sale at 
any one time, differing from each other by make and style as wel l as 
age and physical condition. Thus the actual problem that potential 
cartel members face is not merely to create a numerical allocation of 
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cars to f irms. but to create a pri-'}e schedul e for the cars that are 
l ikely to be offered. and then to allocate cars among f irms by number 
and type . A l a sting agreement of this sort seems more costly to 
obtain than did the agreement s in �ost reported carte l s .42 
Cartel members also would have diff iculty retaining 
significant gains from col lusive behavior because entry into the used 
car busine ss is relatively cheap. An entrant needs primarily to lease 
a l ot and buy cars, which in this case can be done rel atively easily 
because the cartel will have artificial ly depr essed the price s. 
Indeed, f inancing for the purchase of these cars may be obtained more 
easily than usual because the banks and f inance companie s  w il l  be hurt 
by the cartel; thus they may more readily finance its downf al l .  
Further, entry can b e  by exist ing f irms i n  other marke ts. Used car 
marke ts are at l east regional in scope at the whol e sale l evel . If a 
cartel in a particular l ocal marke t has depressed price s by more than 
the difference be tween the whole sale price and shipping cost s  to 
nearby marke ts, firms in these marke ts will enter to bid the price up. 
Repo sse ssing creditors such as banks have an incentive to not ify 
out side f irms of favorable opportunities for entry. The rel ative 
absence of barriers to entry in used goods marke ts, in contrast to 
other marke ts in which carte l s  have been successful , sugge sts strongly 
that collus ive bidding carte l s  are unl ikely; the incentive of existing 
f irms to j oin them should be overborne by the inabil ity of these f irms 
to protect their gains against erosion caused by the entry of new 
f irms. 
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In addi tion, two factor s  peculiar to used goods marke ts--in 
particular marke ts for automobiles--al so sugge st that such carte l s  
w i l l  not exist. First, f inancers often can avoid the effect of strong 
col lusive bidding cartels by refusing to make purchase money loans to 
cons11JD.er s .  I f  this i s  done , de al er s would have to extend credit 
themselves and sell their paper to the f inancers .  The f inancers could 
then insist on recourse arrangement s such that if the cons11JD.er 
defaul ts, the dealer must pay the f inancer and himsel f  col lect the 
debt. In such an arrangement, the dealer rese l l s  the car. To be 
sure, recourse f inancing is more costly to f inancers than direct 
cons11JD.er loans when such l oans are routinely made, but probably would 
be l e s s  co stly than remaining supine before an effective col lusive 
bidding carte l .  I n  consequence, the expected gains to de alers from 
cartel iz ing are l imited not only by the potential entry of new and 
exist ing dealers but by the ability of the f inancer sellers to 
w ithdr aw from the marke t by al tering the way in which they finance 
cons11JD.er transactions. 
The second factor pecul iar to these marke ts that make s 
collusive bidding cartel s  l e s s  l ikely is that the potential col luders 
often use external f inancing t o  maintain their inventories.  These 
de al ers need the good will of at l east some f inancers; as a result, 
the f inancers sometimes have a weapon w ith which to force the de alers 
to bid the coll ateral s' actual value . Carte l s  generally are more 
difficult to maintain when the sellers are n11JD.erous and relatively 
smal l and the buyer s few and l arge . The difficulty occurs be cause the 
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large buyers can exercise countervail ing power, by pl ay ing the sel l er s  
o f f  against each other, strategically withholding orders and s o  
forth.43 In the cons11JD.er goods case, it is the dealer buyers who are 
n11JD.erous and rel atively smal l and, often, the f inancer sel l ers who are 
few and large .  Th e  financers tend to b e  banks and l arge f inance 
companies such as GMAC. But the princ iple seems the same; the few 
large se ller s  sometimes could use weapons such as their abi l i ty to 
withhold f inancing to exercise.e:fcctive countervail ing power against 
the n11JD.erous smal l de alers. 
To summarize, the factors that correlate posi tively with the 
existence of cartels are not present in suffici ent degree to j ustify a 
conclusion that collusive bidding car;:els influence the price s at 
which repo sse ssed coll ateral is sold. As indicated above, l ittle 
direct evidence of such cartel s  exists.44 Respect ing indirect 
evidence, casual surveys of automobile repo sse ssions show that 
f inancing creditors recover approximately 80 percent of the "whol e sale 
value" of the cars they sel l .45 This whol e sal e value repr esent s  a 
prediction by knowledgeable observer:: ,,f the sell ing price s of used 
cars in salable condition at the beginning of each car' s model year. 
At l east part of the apparent 20 percent discount off whol esal e value 
is accounted for by three factor s :  ( i) the expense o f  putting 
repo s se ssed cars into sal abl e conditi on;46 ( ii) the fact that used 
cars are offered for sale throughout the year; and ( iii) the inabil ity 
of f inancers to offer qual ity guarante e s  because they lack the 
f acil ities to diagnose defect s or service warrant ies.  Any unaccounted 
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for difference between book and actual whol e sale price s seems too 
smal l alone to support the inference that col lusive bidding carte l s  
must exist because creditors recover so l ittle i n  repo sse ssion sal es.  
2 .  Dealer Trading Cartels 
In dealer trading cartels, a relatively smal l group of de al ers 
resell repos se ssed cars to each other at l e ss than whol e sal e price s. 
The se cartel s  are easier to create and maintain than col lusive bidding 
cartel s  in some respects but not in others. On balance, they too are 
unl ikely to exist. The f irst factor used above concerned the cost s to 
f irms of carteliz ing behav ior. A dealer trading cartel needs fewer 
members than a col lusive bidding cartel; a few firms with similar 
repo sse ssion experience s, so that they can confer similar reciprocal 
bene f its on each other, seem ingly would suff ice . The effective cartel 
size, however, often will exceed two. In thi s event , the problems of 
numbers and heterogeniety should make it diff icult to dev ise an 
allocation and a pricing structure .•. 
In addition, the members of dealer trading cartel s  must al so 
consider the effect of debtor defaul ts. To see why, recall the 
hypothetical in Part I A above�where the debtor defaulted w ith an 
unpaid debt of SS ,000; a maximizing resal e woul d bring 83 , 000; a 
nonmaximiz ing r esal e  would bring 81,5 00; and creditors could recover 
twelve cent s  on the dollar in insolvency proceedings . On these fact s, 
the creditor' s expected l o ss on defaul t was 8264 greater if he fail ed 
to maximize than if he maximiz ed, when the probabil ity that the debtor 
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would enter insolvency proceedings was . 2 .  If the probabil ity of 
insolvency were . 6 ,  the expected difference be tween not maximiz ing and 
maximiz ing rises to 8792 . In this latter case, the failur e  to 
maximize would be a w inning strategy only if the creditor could make 
an offse tting purchase from the cartel at a much l ower price than the 
creditor would need to make when the probabi l i ty of insolvency was . 2 .  
To b e  specific, if the expected nega tive difference from fail ing to 
maximiz e i s  8290 , the creditor w il l  gain if he can buy a repo sse ssed 
car from the cartel for 83 00 less that its whol e sale marke t value; if 
the expected difference rises to 8700, the creditor must obtain a much 
greater discount off the whol e sale price . Because of the l inkage 
be tween debtor insolvency probabil ities and the price s at which 
dealers woul d want to buy col lateral from each other, cartel members 
would have to reach agreement on the impact that each member' s bad 
debt experience shoul d have on the cartel ' s  allocation and pricing 
structure. An agreement of this sort i s  hard to reach.47 And thi s  
difficulty added t o  the one s de scribed above suggest that i t  would 
seldom be cheaper for f irms to create dealer trading cartel s  than to 
create collusive bidding cartel s .  
In additi on, dealer tradinJ cartel s  present members w ith 
greater opportuni ties to cheat. To see why, consider the forms of 
cheating that could oc cur. Ini tially, firms have an incentive to l ie 
about their bad debt experiences when participating in the creation of 
periodic allocations of purchase s they make from and sal e s  they make 
to the cartel .  Each cartel member has a n  incentive t o  purchase goods 
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from the cartel a t  very low whole sale price s but to retail these goods 
at marke t value . Members would j ust ify making many low price 
purchase s by claiming that their debtors are quite l ikely to be come 
insolvent; in such cases. we have seen, the expected loss from making 
low price sal es--from not maximiz ing�is high, so the abil ity to make 
l ow  price purchase s is e ssential to profitab il ity. In a related vein, 
cartel members have an incentive to sell goods to the cartel at high 
price s because, respect ing e ach indiv idual de fault, the higher the 
price obtained on resale the l ower is the expected loss.  Members 
would j ustify making high price sal e s  by cl aiming that other members' 
debtors probably can sati sfy def ic iency j udgment s in ful l ; when thi s  is 
the case, a dealer would l ose relatively l ittle from making l ow price 
sal e s  and thus woul d not nee d  to make many low price purchase s. 
The probabil ity that a given f irm ' s debtor will enter 
insolvency is diff icul t for out siders to asse ss and is exc e ssively 
costly for the f irm to e stabl ish conv incingly to out siders. This is 
because this probabil ity must be inferred l argely from the particular 
circumstanc e s  of an' individual debtor who has defaul ted rather than, 
as in the original credit extension, from characteristics the debtor 
has in common with many other consumers. Put another way. the 
que stion whether a person is creditworthy is more l ikely to be made on 
obj ective factors, while the que stion whether a person who has missed 
payment s i s  l ikely to drown or recover i s  more l ikely to be made on 
individual, subj ective factors.  In consequence, cheating in the form 
of members attempting to make too many low pr ice purchase s from and 
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too few low price sal e s  to the cartel is l ikely to be common and 
difficul t to stop. In addition, each cartel member has an incentive 
to sel l  some items at full whol esal e value to nomnembers, but to 
cont inue making low price purchase s from the cartel ;  for a creditor 
who maximiz e s  resal e value on his own repossessions but is abl e  to 
purchase goods at artificial ly depresse d  price s will do be tter than 
"hone st" cartel members, who ne cessarily must make many low price 
sales as wel l as low price purchase s. Because sal e s  to out siders can 
be made privately and because a dealer probably can conceal or explain 
a failure to make numerous sal e s  to the cartel ,  at l east for a time, 
cheating in the form of sell ing goods to out siders is also l ikely to 
occur, e special ly by de alers who are facing hard t ime s that they 
consider temporary. The strong incent ives to cheat that dealer cartel 
members have toge ther with the apparent ease with which cheating can 
be done sugge st that dealer trading carte l s  woul d be quite unstab l e .  
The remaining relevant factor s  are more consistent with the 
exi stence of these carte l s, but seemingly not to a signif icant extent . 
Entry of new de alers would be l e s s  l ikely to disrupt particular 
carte l s  be cause potential entr ant s would have diff iculty know ing 
whether carte l s  actually exi sted. On the other hand, if cartel iz ation 
generated exc e s s  profits in partj :'� .. :;r marke ts, new f irms probably 
would enter these marke ts because entry co st s  are l ow .  The general 
downward pressure on price that such entry would cause is a 
disincentive to form cartel s  initially. The spe cial factors noted 
above that made col lusive bidding cartel s  unl ikely would not operate 
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against dealer trading carte l s, for those factor s  all were motivated 
by the abil ity and incentive of the f inancers inj ured by cartel 
behavior to oppo se that behav ior. Dealer trading carte l s  do not 
inj ure f inancers. Dealers, however, do compete with f inancers in 
offering credit to consumers. If de alers routinely begin to claim 
greater def ic i encies than f inancers on otherwise simil ar loans. 
because of de aler trading cartel s, dealer credit would become 
rel atively more expensive than f inancer credit. Consumers would then 
have an incentive to shift away from dealer credit; their abil i ty  
conveniently to do thi s  al so reduces the expected gains to cartel 
behavior. 
Dealer trading carte l s, analys i s  sugge sts, thus seem not much 
more l ikely to influence the price s at which· repo ssessed col lateral is 
sold than are col lusive bidding carte l s .  No direct evidence o f  the 
exi stence of deal ing trading cartel s  has been offered, nor is there 
indirect evidence . In particular, de al ers seem ingly do not cl aim 
l arger def ic i enc ie s  than f inancers_on similar credit extensions, which 
would occur if dealer trading carte l s  were common.48 If a 
de cisiomnaker nevertheless bel ieved that such cartel s  po se a danger, a 
l egal remedy that would be as effective and l e s s  intrusive than the 
reforms summariz ed in Part I woul d be to require all sal e s  to be 
pub l i c .  Since nomnembers would then l earn o f  the sal es, they could 
overbid the cartel for repo sse ssed goods, causing the cartel to 
dissolve. The l ikel ihood that de alers trading cartel s  exist, however, 
seems too l ow to j ustify incurring the cost s that would flow from a 
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compl e te ban on private sal es.49 
D. Summary 
The bel ief that creditors systematica l ly fail to maximiz e the 
value of reposse sse d  collateral has been influential in causing 
decisiomnakers to adopt or propo se restrict ions on the taking of 
security interests in consumer goods. Part II A has shown that 
creditors acting al one have incentives only to maximiz e resal e value . 
Part II B then demonstrated that the pract ice of many creditors to 
whol e sale rather than retail their repo sse ssions i s  cons i stent with 
the view that creditors maximiz e .  Inde ed, requiring r etail sal e s, a s  
some have propo sed, actually woul d cause debtors to pay higher 
def iciencies than they now do. Finally, Part II C showed that 
creditors could do be tter by fail ing to maximiz e resale value if they 
could successful ly carte l iz e  resale marke ts. Part II C went on to 
argue that no pursuasive evidence of the existence of creditor cartel s  
exists, and that theory sugge sts their existence t o  b e  improbabl e .  In 
consequence of this analys i s, publ ic pol icy should no longer be made 
on the assumption that creditors do not maximiz e; the assumption must 
be the other way. 
III. REPOSSESSION AND THE ALLF.GED DESIRUCTION OF VALUE 
Coercive repo sse ssion i s  said to impo se greater harms on 
debtors than it creat1os gains for creditor s .  This m ight occur i n  four 
ways.  First. debtors may value goods in their po ssession at in exc e ss 
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of the goods ' marke t price . For exampl e, a consumer would sell hi s 
stereo for no l ess than S600 but its used goods price is S500 . When 
the stereo is repo sse ssed and resold for S500,  SlOO of value al l egedly 
is de stroyed. Second, the l ack of effective resal e marke ts may unduly 
depress the value of used goods. Suppo se that the debtor' s stereo 
would b e  worth at l east S500 to anyone who knew how rel iable it was, 
such as the debtor himsel f, but strangers would fear breakdowns and 
thus would pay no more than S400 for the stereo. The marke t price for 
used stereos i s  artificial ly depr essed because owners know more about 
their goods than out siders do. In thi s  illustration, the information 
asymme try caus e s  a SlOO value l o ss because the repo sse ssing creditor 
could sell the stereo for at most S400 . Third, repossession could 
de stroy human capital . As an exampl e, the stereo may work perfectly 
if treated in a certain fashion that the debtor has discovered. When 
the stereo is repo sse ssed and resold, the new owner must take time to 
l earn-- if he ever does learn--how best to use it. In consequence, the 
debtor ' s inve stment in l earning� to use his stereo is wasted. 
Fourth, reposse ssion may cause debtors to incur psychic losses that 
are not off se t  by psychic or other gains el sewhere .  
These harms could not occur if debtors were perfectly informed 
of the consequence s of granting security. This is because if security 
impo sed greater expected harms on debtors than it created expected 
gains for crditors, the creditors could not purchase the consent of 
the debtors to grant security; rather, the debtors woul d choose to pay 
higher interest rate s. Information imperf ect ions are bel ieved to be 
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common i n  consumer credit marke ts, however, and f a l l  within the s e t  of 
contract reasons that are not discussed here . Part III instead 
assumes that debtors when they borrow are ignorant of the po ssibil ity 
that repo sse ssion could cause them to incur lo sse s such as those j ust 
described. 
If debtors are so uninformed and if these l osse s do occur, 
reposse ssion would be morally obj ectionab l e .  A l egal inst i tution that 
cause s greater harms than gains is unsatisf actory on util itarian 
grounds. Repo sse ssion a l so could v iolate the Kant ian f airne ss 
principl e that each person should be treated with equal respect and 
concern. Thi s is because a creditor who will impose a Sl , 000 loss on 
a debtor to secure for himself a S300 gain is treating the debtor ' s 
interests as of much l e s s  signif icance than his own, apparently 
without a moral basis for the distinct ion. The que st ion, then, is 
whether repo sse ssion actual ly doe s  destroy value . Part Ill next 
argue s, depending on the way in which repo s se ssion is all eged to 
impo se harm, ei ther that no social losse s occur from it, or that no 
ne t social losse s can be shown to occur, or that any net social losse s 
that do occur are triv ial . 
The f irst form of the value de struct ion cl aim, that a debtor 
lose s  the difference between the value he attaches to the goods and 
their marke t price, se emingly assumes what is to be de cided.  To see 
why, let P = the col l ateral s '  used goods marke t price and W be the 
price that the debtor woul d charge to se ll the collateral voluntarily. 
In the il lustration that introduce d  Section III, P = SSOO and W = 
3 6  
8600; thus repo sse ssion impo sed a 8100 l o s s  o n  the debtor. However, 
one can " lo se" only what one " owns. • Suppo se that the state had 
prev iously de cided to confer on secured creditors the absolute right 
to repo sse ss whenever a debtor defaul ted. Then the debtor seemingly 
woul d l ose nothing from repo sse ssion because after default he woul d 
own nothing . The que stion, that is,  apparently is whether creditors 
or debtors have a right to the collateral on default, and the initial 
version of the value de struction claim presuppo sed but did not j ustify 
an answer to thi s  que stion; it simply assumed that debtors had the 
right. 
This version of the value destruction claim can be stated in a 
nonconclusory way if a debtor who l acked the right to keep the 
collateral in the event of default would bid in exce ss of its marke t 
price to prevent repo s se ssion. Let V = the price a debtor would pay 
to keep the goods if he had no l egal right to them. Then if V > P, 
the debtor incur s a value l o ss even though he l acks the property 
right. Proponents of this f irst ( o.f four ) ver sions of the value 
destruction cl aim seemingly suppose the losse s that debtors incur from 
repo sse ssion to be nontrivial; in the terminology used here, they 
suppose W-P to be l arge . If they are right, V also is l ikely to 
exceed P. This is because the price which the debt or woul d bid for 
the right to keep the goods (V) is unl ikely to be very much lower than 
the price the debtor would choose to sell the right (W) , so that if 
the l atter is considerably greater than the marke t price (P) , the 
f ormer will exceed the marke t price also. 5 0  In thi s event. the value 
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de struct ion claim can b e  made out independently o f  where the property 
right i s .  The debtor' s loss i s  W-P if h e  owns the right and V-P if he 
doe s  not, with both magnitude s exce edi ng z ero. It i s  a separate 
que stion whether in fact both magni tude s are po sitive, but for now 
thi s  i s  assumed. 
A compl e te statement of the initial version of the value 
destruction claim must a l so e:z:plain why a debt or who value s goods at 
in exc e s s  of their marke t price would ever defaul t .  To understand 
thi s  problem, let D be the out standing debt, which is the unpaid 
portion of the price, with V and P be ing def ined a s  above. Suppo se 
the debtor ' s circumstanc e s  have changed after a sal e such that he 
comes to bel ieve that the goods are worth l e s s  to him than the unpaid 
price; for example, the debtor has be come unemployed and would rather 
spend scarce resource s on rent rather than stereo payment s. In thi s 
event, the debtor has an incentive to abandon the deal because the 
goods are worth l e s s  to him than the out standing debt (D > V) . 
Repo sse ssion would also disadvantage him. As an exampl e, let D = 
8650; V = 8590; P = 8500 . If the credi tor repo sse sse s and resells. he 
will sue for D - P = 8150 . If the creditor can sue only for the debt, 
the debtor' s l o ss is the debt l e s s  the value of the goods the debtor 
retains--D - V = 860 . Thus repo sse s sion impo se s an additional S90 
loss on the debtor, the difference between what the debtor would pay 
for the right to keep the goods and their used goods' price (V - P) . 
This case probably is common because the marke t price of many consumer 
goods decl ine s more rapidly after purchase than the util ity that 
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consumers derive from the stream of service s the goods yield. 
However, if the debtor bel ieves with certainty that the creditor w il l  
sue for D - P ,  he seem ingly would not defaul t; rather, he woul d pay D, 
al though D > V, because this cut s his loss to D - V, which is S60 
here . A debtor, though, could reasonably bel ieve that his creditor 
will not sue because def iciencies are sought in a minority of cases. 
Al so, if the debtor defaul t s, he can use the money that woul d 
otherwise go to the creditor to meet immediate needs; the bene f it of 
be ing abl e  to do this may sometimes exceed the cost of later having to 
pay a def ic iency j udgment by means of a wage garni shment . For some 
persons, that i s, defaul t i s  a way of extending the payment period.5 1  
It i s  now po s sibl e  t o  state the initial version o f  the value 
de struction cl aim compl etely : If ( i) debtors woul d ..!,§}; a sum in 
exc e s s  of the col l ateral ' s use d  goods marke t price to allow a creditor 
to repo sse ss on default (W - P > 0 ) ;  or ( ii) debtors would b id a sum 
in exc e s s  of the used goods marke t price to retain the coll ateral in 
this event (V - P > 0) ; and ( ii i) .debtors routinely default when the 
util ity they would derive from retaining the unpaid portion of the 
price exceeds the util ity they would derive from retaining the goods 
(D > W or V) , then repo sse ssion cause s debtors to lose value . 
Further, if ( iv) creditors nece ssarily derive l e s s  value from 
repo sse ssed goods than debtors lose and (v) repo sse s sion does not 
otherwise create value, repo sse ssion al so causes ne t social harms. 
The l atter two a s sumptions seem less l ikely to hold than the 
f irst three. Respecting a s sumpt ion ( iv) , consider the repo sse ssing 
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creditor i n  his status as a sel l er o f  used goods . Firms are said t o  
sell until marginal co st equal s marginal revenue ; the marginal unit, 
that is,  brings in a s  revenue an amount equal to the cost of producing 
and sell ing it. Most units that are sold, however. are inframarginal; 
they bring in revenue in exc e s s  of cost . Suppo se then that ( a )  the 
marke t price of a used item is S500; ( b )  the defaulting debtor would 
pay 8590 for the right to retain the item; ( c )  the product when 
reposse ssed and resold is inframarginal to the creditor, bringing in 
revenue of 8120 over cost s; ( d )  the debtor and credi tor have the same 
marginal util ity for money. In thi s circumstance, repo sse ssion 
actually creates a net soc i al gain; the creditor gains S30 of util ity 
more than the debtor l o se s .  Also, the creditor i s  not acting on the 
bel ief that costs impo sed on the debtor are of considerably less 
concern than gains to him. In actual cases, it would be impo ssible to 
know whether repo sse ssion creates ne t social gains or l osse s. This i s  
because the parties probably wil l have different marginal util ities 
for money, but these ut il ities as well as the debtors' bid and a sk 
price s--the pr ice s for which they would buy or sel l  the right to keep 
the goods--are unobservab l e .  The point of the il lustration rather is 
to show that the creditor' s ne t gain from repo sse ssion and resale i s  
not ne cessarily l e s s  than the debtor' s loss. 
Assumption (v) above also i s  unl ikely to hold beca.use se cond 
buyers commonly value resold goods at in exce ss of their price . This 
point i s  made cl early with a graph. The curves S ( supply) and D 
(demand) are for used goods at the time when the debtor de cide s  that 
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the goods are worth l e ss to him than the unpa id portion of the pr ice . 
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The debtor in this il lustration is locate d  at point A on the supply 
curve S; this means, supposing him to have the property right, that he 
• 
would not sell the collateral at its used goods marke t price, P • but 
would s e l l  if the price rose to P1 • The difference between these two 
price s CP1 - p*) is the debtor ' s loss from repo sse ssion, in the sense 
at i s sue her e .  Th e  second buyer i s  located at point B on the demand 
curve D; this means that he would buy the product if its price were as 
high as P1 .  The difference between this price and the marke t price 
at which he is abl e to purchase CP1 - p*) is the second buyer' s gain. 
In this illustration, these gains and losse s are exactly offsetting, 
but they need not be; considering j ust the debtor and se cond buyer, 
repo sse ssion and resale could create net soc ial gains or lo sse s, 
depending on the valuation the partie s attach to the goods. 
Unfortunately, these valuations are unobservable, but the point is the 
same; repo s se ssion does not necessarily de stroy value . 
To summarize, if the debtor' s loss from repo sse s sion i s  
conceptual ized a s  the difference between the price for which the 
debtor would buy or sell the right to keep the collateral and the 
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col lateral ' s marke t price, repos se s sion woul d create net social losse s 
only if the debtor' s loss typically exce eds the creditor' s and se cond 
buyer' s gain. Decisionmakers cannot know whether this i s  the case . 
From a util itarian perspective, however, the analysis doe s  show the 
fallacy of a cl aim that repos s e ssion necessarily create s net social 
losse s because debtors always l o se value • .  Also, if speculation i s  
fair, repo sse ssion may create net soci al gains. Th i s  i s  because 
debtors seem more l ikely to default when they care relatively less 
about retaining posse ssion; in the l anguage use d  here, default often 
occurs when the value the debtor attaches to the coll ateral is not 
much above its marke t price . The smal ler i s  the debtor' s l o ss, the 
more l ikely is it to be outweighP::" ·by the gains repos se s sion create s 
for the creditor and second buyer. Whether repo sse ssion create s ne t 
social gains or not, the foregoing analysis al so defeats the Kantian 
fairne s s  obj ection. Creditors know that repossession often yields 
them net gains and that second buyers often value resold collateral at 
in exc e s s  of its marke t price, but the creditors cannot know their 
debtors' bid and a sk prices.  Thus creditors never know whether the irs 
and others gains exceed the debtors' lo sse s; in consequence, creditors 
cannot be said always t o  act on the bel ief that their concerns are of 
much greater signif icance than those of their debtors in respect of 
the f inancial costs that attend defauU .. 
The second version of the value destruction claim asserts that 
repo sse ssion create s greater harms than gains in consequence of the 
rapid and extensive depr eciation to which consumer goods often are 
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subj ect. lhis deprec iation allegedly is a function of the absence of 
effective resale marke ts for used conswner goods . It is said to 
de stroy value because repo sse s se d  goods are "worth" more than the 
unduly low price s they command. 5 2  
Tw o  f actors apparently contribute most to the depreciation of 
consumer goods, ne ither of Yhich support the conclusion that 
r epo sse ssion de stroys value . First, new goods command a premium 
partly because of their newne ss; consumers, that is, want the 
experience of the f irst few drives in a new car or the f irst v ieYs of 
a new television. Because each such experience can be had only once, 
when they are important new goods will sel l  for much more than used 
goods , Al though the premium that new goods command may sometimes be 
l arge because of the "newne ss" factor, repo s se ssion cannot destroy 
value . lhe debtor, being the f irst buyer, by then has conswned the 
rel evant good; he has exhausted the product' s newne ss. lhus he lose s 
nothing when the product is taken and resold at a discount that 
refl ect s its used goods character • .  
A second factor that may contribute to the allegedly excessive 
depreciation of consumer goods collateral is a function of the greater 
probabil ity that these goods will fail and of the inabil ity of buyers 
to observe this probabil ity. To understand the po s sibl e  effect of the 
re sultant information asymmetry, suppo se that car s are of two kinds, 
good one s and bad one s, but consumers cannot tell the difference 
before they purchase . After use, a consumer knows which kind of car 
he has. An information a symmetry has then devel oped, since car owners 
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know more than (used) car buyers about vehicle qual ity. All used cars 
in similar model classe s  must trade at the same price, however, for 
consumers cannot distinguish good from bad. lhis single price w il l  
approximate the price o f  bad cars. Were the marke t price higher than 
the price of bad cars. all bad car owners youl d sell their car s and 
buy good one s .  Potential purchasers thus must suppose that far more 
bad cars will be offered for sal e than good one s at any price above 
the bad car price, and will b i d  the price down to thi s low price . A 
car owner with a good car--and more cars w il l  be good than bad�is 
therefore l ocked in, His car is worth more than the (bad car) marke t 
price, yet he can only get this price . More to the point, yhen thi s 
debtor' s car is repo sse ssed, it will be resold at the bad car price . 
If the debtor had a good car, and more cars are good than bad, 
repo sse ssion thus inflicts harm on the debtor in exc e ss of the price 
the car can command in the marke t.53 Moreover, this harm occurs 
independently of which party is assumed to have a right to the goods 
in the event of defaul t. If the debtor has the right, he suffers harm 
in the fashion j ust described. If the creditor has the right, the 
information asymmetry prevent s t� : .: editor from sell ing the goods at 
their " true" value; in consequence, the def iciency that the debtor 
will have to pay is increased, 
Al though debtors sometimes may lose value in the sense at 
i s sue here when goods are repo s se ssed. for three reasons the 
conclusion that repo sse ssion creates ne t social harms doe s not fol low .  
First, the qual ity o f  some used goods, such as furniture, seems 
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observable before purchase . As to thi s  coll ateral. the information 
a symme try on which the argument rests doe s not exist. Second, suppo se 
a good repo sse ssed car actual ly is offered for sal e at the bad car 
price . In consequence, the percentage of good cars in the used car 
marke t has increased, al though used car buyers do not know this .  A 
buyer of this repo s se s sed car thus gets a w indfall. a good car at the 
price of a bad o ne .  This gain must be se t against the l o s s  that the 
debtor suffered; depending on the parties'  preferences. reposse ssion 
again could create ne t social gains or lo sse s. For example, if the 
debtor used the car occa sionally for recreational use but the second 
buyer was a travel ing salesman, the second buyer probably would gain 
more from owning a good car than the debtor woul d l ose by be ing 
without one . Third, marke t insti tutions often w il l  correct for the 
information asymmetry, so that repo s se ssed i tems-here cars--wil l be 
sold at their " true" worth. One such insti tution is the guarantee.  
An automobile dealer who rese l l s  the cars he repo s se s se s can 
conveniently learn the qual ity of tlj.ese cars, and has an incentive to 
rese l l  the good one s with the appropriate used car guaranty. Thus 
repo sse sse d  cars probably trade at price s that approximate their 
value . When inst itutions such as guarantees are effective, debtors do 
not l o se value in the sense at i ssue here.S 4  
Th e  third way i n  which repo s se s sion is said to destroy value 
i s  through the destruction of human capital that repo sse ssion create s. 
To see how this could oc cur. suppo se the debtor owns a car that always 
starts if treated in a certain way but w il l  not start in cold weather 
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if treated otherwise. The car is then repo s se ssed and resold but the 
se cond buyer is i gnorant of its character. The inve stment the debtor 
made in learning how to use the car is thus destroyed, with no 
offse tting gain.SS 
Value i s  l o st when human capital is de stroyed in this way. but 
the l osse s seem occasional and sl ight for three reasons. First. human 
capital will not exist respecting many consumer goods. There is no 
trick to making a couch work. Second, people seldom need tricks to 
make new goods work. This i s  partly be cause they often do work. When 
they do not--a new car does not start in cold weather--the goods 
commonly are f ixed under warranty or a disadvantaged buyer has the 
right to revoke his acceptance . Since repo sse ssed goods often are 
nearly ner--defaul t can occur only during the payment period-debtors 
seldom will have invested human capital in learning how to use them.s 6 
Third, most consumers lack technical ski l l s. In consequence, the 
methods they develop to make used goods work commonly are easy to 
di scover. The se cond buyer in the illustration above thus should 
quickly learn how to start the car. These three rea sons taken 
together show that the destruction of human capital inherent in 
repo sse ssion is too trivial to support extensive restrictions on 
se curity interest s in consumer goods . 
In summary, if the harm that repo sse ssion impo se s on debtors 
is conceptual ized in " economic" terms-debtors l o se human capital or 
the difference be tween the goods' value to them and its price­
repo sse s sion impo se s trivial harms, �o harms at all, or harms that 
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cannot be shown to exceed the gains, depending on how one considers 
the harm to have been inf l icted. Under none of these outcomes are the 
util itarian and Kantian obj ections to repo sse ssion persua sive .  
I f  "psychic" rather than " economic" cost s are considered, 
debtors could suffer l osse s from repo sse s sion not offset by gains 
e l sewhere, at l east in theory. Suppo se that debtors are humiliated 
when creditors foreclose on l iened property. Then if ( i) creditors 
derive no pleasure from repo s se s sing other than the pleasure of 
reducing the debt; ( ii) buyers of repo sse s se d  goods derive no pleasure 
from knowing ( if they do know) that the goods were reposse ssed and 
( ii i) debtors would regard the forceabl e withholding of a portion of 
their wage s from each paycheck�garni shment�as l e s s  humil iating than 
repo sse ssion, coercive property execution impo se s psychic harms not 
offset by gains e l sewhere. 5 7  
This l ine o f  attack against repossession i s  unconvincing given 
present understanding of the phenomenon. Ini tially, whether 
repo sse ssion creates ne t psychic lQsse s i s  uncertain. Assumption ( i) 
above is problematic and a s sumption ( ii i) is more so, for whil e the 
debtor ' s family and c l o se fri ends would know whether garni shment or 
repo s se ssion has o ccurred, garni shment s seem at l east as pub l ic a s  
repo sse ssions, since garni shment s be come known to the debtor' s 
employer and coworkers. Further, banning repo s se s si on entai l s  cost s. 
Under current l aw, creditors have the choice of repo sse ssion or 
garni shment . That many creditors choose the former method sugge st s 
that it sometimes has advantage s over the latter.58 Banning 
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repo sse ssion thus w ill create cost s that must be set against any 
psychic losse s  that repo sse ssion may cause . Precisely comparing these 
sets of cost s seems impo ssible so a util itarian ca se against 
repos se ssion is unpersuasive even when psychic cost s  are considered. 
Finally, in the absence of a coherent claim that repo ssessions impose 
greater dignitary harms on persons than garni shment s, a Kantian ca se 
against repo s se s sion, on the ground that it inevitably is 
disrespectful to debtors, again is not compel l ing . 
IV. IN TERROREM REPOSSESSIONS 
The di sapproval of se curity in consumer context s rests partly 
on the bel ief that creditors do not take it to rai se revenue in the 
usual sense�through forecl osure and resale; instead, creditors use 
the threat of foreclosure to coerce payment .5 9  The bel ief that 
security functions primarily as an in terrorem device is l inked to the 
two j ustifications discus sed above : b ecause creditors are indifferent 
to the returns that foreclosur e  brings�the failure to maximiz e 
claim--and because repo sse sse d  goods are worth l ittl e--the de struction 
of value cl aim--creditors must take security only for its threat 
value . That creditors commonly so act should now seem l e s s  pl ausible, 
but the i s sue here is whether in terrorem repo sse ssions are 
blameworthy, however often done . Part IV argue s that some of the 
concerns that seemingly animate the dista ste for in terrorem 
repo sse ssions are mispl aced and others are unpersua sive. 
Before reaching the analysis, it is helpful to def ine an in 
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terrorem repo sse ssion. Suppose that creditors repo sse ss only when the 
gains to them from doing so exceed the cost s .  Let these gains be 
direct and indirect : direct gains derive from resale revenue s; 
indirect gains derive from the e:z:pected improvement in the creditor' s 
col lection experience because each actual repo sse s sion make s more 
bel ievable the creditor ' s constant threat to impo se costs on 
nonpayers. An in terrorem repo sse ssion then occurs when repo ssession 
cost s exceed the direct gains but are l e s s  than the sum of direct and 
indirect gains. This def inition captures the all egedly obj ect ionable 
feature of in terrorem repo sse s sions--that they would not be made 
except for their value in e stabl ishing credible threats. The 
def inition a l so rest s on the premise that repo s se ssions can.not be 
obj ectionable, in the sense at issue here, when their direct gains 
exceed their direct costs,  even though they may produce indirect 
gains. This is because the debtor ' s agreement to give security 
seemingly impl ies his consent to the use of security for its pl ainly 
legitimate purpose-to reduce the o.ut standing deb t .  
I n  terrorem repos se s sions may be thought improper for e x  ante 
reasons--it is wrong for creditors to coerce payment by threatening 
foreclo sure--or for ex post reasons--it is wrong for creditors to make 
exampl e s  of debtors who differ in no rel evant respect s from those 
whose goods are untouched. Regul ating se curity is an inappropriate 
re sponse to the f irst set of concerns. The all eged evil of threats to 
take the collateral at once i s  that the threats may cause debtors to 
forego defense s to the underlying cl aim. These defense s are of two 
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kinds : rea sons not to pay that are s ufficient under current l aw, such 
as a creditor' s breach of warranty, and reasons not to pay that " in 
good conscience" should prevail, such as the debtor ' s illne ss. The 
response that i s  cal led for by the concern that threats of forecl o sur e  
could cause debtors to forego l egal defense s i s  to require creditors 
to j ustify their cl aims to an impartial third party and to permit 
debtors to assert defense s before the goods can be repo sse s sed. This 
is best done by means of a prel iminary hearing, such as may be 
const itutionally required when creditors attach property under the 
authority of state statutes rather than private contract s. 6 0  In l ight 
of the very smal l percentage of debtors who could rai se tenab l e  l egal 
defense s to a cl aim of foreclosure, prohibiting foreclosur e  altogether 
or making it materially more difficult are response s that seem 
di sproportionate to the alleged ev il . 
Critics of security al so are concerned w ith " moral" defense s 
to nonpayment . The l iterature supporting regulation often contains 
cl aims that debtors fail to pay largely because of circumstanc e s  
beyond their control, such as i l lne s s  o r  unempl oyment . 61 The premise 
underlying these cl aims apparently is that it is too harsh to make 
debtors who have suffered such misfortune choose be tween payment or 
repossession. Regul ating repo s se s sions is an inappropriate response 
to thi s  concern because the concern actually goe s  to the circumstanc e s  
under which payment should be excused. It is be st to focus directly 
on the excuse i s sue rather than treat it obliquely by restrict ing 
se curity. To see why, suppose that involuntary unempl oyment i s  
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thought to be a proper excusing circumstance . 62 Current restrict ions 
on the taking of security permit a secured creditor to foreclose if he 
then e schews a suit on the debt or to sue but forego foreclosure .  The 
secured credi tor thus can col lect at l east some of the debt even 
though security is regulated. If unempl oyment should excuse payment, 
however, the creditor should receive nothing. Suppo se instead that 
unempl oyment is thought not to excuse defaul t. Then restrict ions on 
security are unfair, because they often cause creditors to be paid 
l e ss than in ful l al though debtors have no l egitimate excuse for 
defaul ting. It i s, in short, unwise to respond to the excuse i s sue by 
regulating se curity, because such regul ation seemingly insures only 
that debtors w il l  have to pay too much or too l ittl e .  
Th e  se cond set of obj ections to i n  terrorem repo ssessions 
focuses on their property of making exampl e s  of particular debt ors .  
Th i s  concern has two aspects.  The f irst i s  an expectations obj ection: 
the debtor whose goods are taken could not rea sonably think i t  would 
be he who would suf fer. The se cond i s  an equal ity cl aim: many 
debtors fail to pay; no good reason exists to puni sh this debtor. 
Neither cl aim is persuasive. Respecting expe ctations, the signing of 
a se curity agreement is not ice to the debtor that the goods may be 
taken if he fail s to pay. Also, creditors have incentives to 
overstate the frequency with which they foreclose ,  and probably often 
do so. In these circumstances, each debtor should and l ikely doe s  
know that reposse ssion i s  a l ive prospe ct. Thus claims of unfair 
surprise will sel dom be tenabl e .  
51 
The equal ity claim is not compel l ing b e cause good reasons 
exist to make in terrorem repo sse ssions. They reduce cost s for 
debtors as a group .  This i s  because creditors have an incentive to 
use the l east cost method of ensuring payment ; if this method i s  
banne d, more costly one s w il l  be used, and debtors w il l  bear part of 
the resultant cost increase. If the threat of repo sse ssion i s  the 
l east cost me thod and is to be effective, some repo sse s sions must be 
made . The que stion then be comes whether the equal ity goal--al l 
debtors should be forecl osed against or none-should take precedence 
over the group wel fare and de sert goal s--consumers generally bene f it 
from se lective foreclosure and this debtor de serves to be forecl o sed 
against be cause he did not pay. In the criminal l aw, the equal ity 
goal-all persons who commit crimes slwuld be simil arly prosecuted and 
puni shed-is subordinated to the group wel fare and de sert goal s; no 
one has a right to avoid conviction because a similar perpe trator was 
not prosecuted. This princ iple becomes controversial in only two 
circumstance s :  when the criminal s against whom the state seeks to 
visit sanctions would suffer drastic and irreversible consequence s  
such a s  being executed; 63 or when re source constraints enabl e the 
state to proceed against only a subset of suspected crimina l s  and the 
subset is sel ected by di sfavored criteria such as race . By analogy. 
then, a defaulting debtor whose goods are taken for deterrence reasons 
has prima fac ie no be tter cl aim of excuse than the burglar who i s  
fairly caught. Most burglars are not caught, but this burglar 
actually committed the crime, and burgl ary is a bad action that may be 
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reduced by conviction; by the same rea soning, the debtor failed t o  
pay. and unjustified nonpayment i s  a bad act ion that may be reduced by 
forecl osure. In addition, rel evant difference s often may exist 
be tween debtors whose goods are taken and those who e scape. Creditors 
have incentives to preserve good will whil e collect ing debt s. These 
incent ives should l ead them to make in terrorem repo sse s sions only 
against obv ious deadbeats; and creditors cl aim to proceed, in the 
contexts in which in terrorem repo sse ssions are said to occur, 
primarily against per sons who do not pay without even the moral 
excuse s  discus sed above. 
v. mRAL OBJECTIONS ro SECURITY 
The j ustifications for regulating security di scussed above, in 
particular the cl aims that repo s se ssion de stroys value or i s  done for 
in terrorem motives, seem animated by a set of inchoate moral 
concerns. All ow ing creditors to take unrestricted se curity interest s 
in consumer goods i s  fel t unj ust if iably to deprive persons of 
property. but those who bel ieve this have yet to show how their bel ief 
follows from current normative conceptions of the source s of property 
rights. In consequence of the bel ief and this failur e, critics of 
se curity often cast moral obj ections to it in the more famil iar 
l anguage of econom ics . These obj ections should be evaluated directly. 
Part V attempt s to expl icate theories of property rights from which 
obj ections to security could tenably be derived; it then argue s that 
these obj ect ions cannot support present regul ation. 64 
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Two prel iminary matters shoul d be clarif ied before reaching 
the analysi s .  First. the argument assume s :  ( i) peopl e understand 
that to give a security interest means to authorize the creditor to 
repossess the specified col lateral in the event of nonpayment ; ( ii) 
consumer credit contracts are set f orth in readily under standab l e  
l anguage, and requisite disclosur es are made i n  such fashion a s  to be 
easily acted on; ( ii i) consumer credit marke ts are compe titive. These 
a s sumptions are made not because they are true but to focus attention 
on the que stion whether security is morally obj ect ionable in 
relatively ideal circumstance s. n� gnl ation to cure the problems 
generated by the failure of any of these a s sumpt i ons to obtain in 
actual marke ts has famil iar j ustif ications that can be derived from 
unconscionabil ity doctrine s. 
Second, recent l egisl ation in this area has been influenced by 
a bel ief that consumers in unregul ated marke ts put their property too 
much at risk. This bel ief is partly responsible for two kinds of 
regul ation: restrictions on the taking of se curity bel ong to the 
class that directly l im its risk taking; rel axed requirement s for 
be coming a bankrupt and expanded bankruptcy exemptions, 65 in contr ast, 
amel iorate the conseque nces of risk taking . An ideal treatment of any 
particular aspect of this legislation would consider both types of 
response s to risk taking because they may be rel ated.  For exampl e ,  
de cisiomnakers could want to relax restrict ions o n  risk taking 
initially because, through bankruptcy legislation, they have minimiz ed 
the consequenc e s  that risk taking generate s. This paper neverthel ess 
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only discus ses an a spect of risk l imiting r egul ation, Ihis is because 
the subj ect of risk taking in consumer transact ions seems too broad 
and complex to be treated as a whole, given present l evel s of 
understanding; rather, the be st chance of understanding it apparently 
lies in making de tailed analyse s of various of its parts. 
An analysis of property interest obj ections to the taking of 
security must focus on the relationship that peopl e have to physical 
things .  Ih e  principal coercive col lection dev ice s used in consumer 
transactions are garni shment and forecl o sure, Re strictions on the 
taking of security will increase the use of garni shment s; if one 
col lection device i s  l imited, creditors will shif t to the other. 
Since it is assumed here that col l ecting debts is an innocent activity 
in the absence of a bankruptcy proceeding, the que stion then becomes 
whether se curity po se s a greater threat to property rights than 
garni shment doe s .  I t  i s  this que stion that requires a n  inquiry into 
the po ssibl e  ev il s of creditors taking things rather than money. 
Two rel ated theories of pr9perty rights. both of which derive 
from the effect on personal autonomy of the po sse ssion of things. seem 
germane . Ihe f irst i s  a wel fare rights theory which holds that each 
person needs an irreducibl e  minimum of physical things in order to 
l ead a ful l and autonomous l if e .  Such a l ife cannot b e  l ed by one 
de stitute of po sse ssions. If the state were to sanction the taking of 
everything a person owns. it would therefore be permitting the 
destruction of hi s abil ity to be a ful l member of society, To treat 
persons in thi s way po se s a threat to the community' s viabil ity and 
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al so i s  impermis sibly disrespe ctful to them, In consequence, the 
state should ensure that people w il l  always retain the requi site 
minimum of posse s sions. 66 Ihe second theory focuse s more directly on 
the rel ation of peopl e to physical obj ect s. holding that peopl e partly 
const itute themselves through their po sse ssion of tangibl e things; 
peopl e. in effect, are at l east partly what they own, Much property 
that peopl e own obviously is " fungiblen-a toaster or a tire iron--but 
some property is "personal" in the sense that the po sse ssor' s 
personal ity is bound up with owning i t-a wedding r ing or a home, Ihe 
same property may be fungibl e to one owner and personal to another 
because peopl e invest themselves in different kinds of things, but the 
rel evant point is that some property is personal in a whol esome rather 
than a fetishistic sense , If the state were to allow the taking of 
anything a person may own, it must ne cessarily al low the taking of 
"personal property"; this could result in the de struction of important 
aspects of peopl e ' s personal ities. Because peopl e have a right to be 
whol e, they have a right to own • -_ .; se things in which their whol ene ss 
partly reside s, 67 
Both of these theories acc0rd people rights to things that are 
good against (at l east some forms of) involuntary dive stment . Ihe 
i s sue in this context. however, is a� ienabil ity :  can a person 
voluntarily pledge his refrigerat-:·_.: or his father' s watch as security 
for a l oan?68 In answering thi s  que stion, it is helpful to 
dist inguish b e tween se curity interests of this sort and purchase money 
security interest s. which are taken by se l lers or l enders to secure 
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the purchase pr ice . Purchase money security interests are common in 
conne ction with instal lment sal e s  of consumer goods . It would be 
contradictory of the property rights theories j ust se t out to prohibit 
them. If peopl e prefer to give purchase money security interests 
rather than pay higher interest rate s or cash price s, making purchase 
money security less attractive to creditors w il l  compel people to 
forego purchase s or will increase their difficulty in purchasing. 
Respecting the wel fare rights theory, it is contradictory to increase 
the cost s to a person of assembl ing the irreducibl e  minimum of goods 
nece s sary to his l eading a ful l and autonomous l ife, in the name of 
enabl ing him to l ead that l if e .  I f  a particular item would be 
included in the set of items that it i s  thought e s sential for a person 
to OYn, diff icul ties should not be put in the way of his acquiring 
that item. Respecting the second theory, it is contradictory to 
increase the diff icul ty a person has in buying goods that will become 
a part of himsel f, in the name of protecting h i s  interest in goods 
that are a part of himsel f. Because both rel evant property theories 
protect peopl e' s rights to J!X!!, things, these theories seemingly should 
permit persons to alienate�to mortgage--goods when al ienation will 
materially increase the opportunity for ownership. Moral obj ect ions 
to the giv ing of se curity thus must inhere in the unrelatedne ss of 
security to acqui sition; people can give purchase money security 
interests but perhaps should not be al l owed to mortgage what they 
already own. 
The conclusion that broad security interests in consumer goods 
57 
should be restricted doe s  not fol lOY from the notion of unrelatedne ss 
al one . To see why, recall that peopl e now are free to sell their 
po sse ssions : a person can convert the irreduc ibl e  minimum of goods to 
cash or se l l  " the old home place . •69 This freedom is only partly 
j ustified by administrative convenience; for insti tutions such as 
conservatorships exist or could be fashioned to prevent peopl e from 
sel l ing all their goods. Rather, the freedom to sel l  is also 
j ustified by notions of personal autonomy. Should these notions 
permit sal e s  but prevent mortgage s ?  
Answers se emingly must derive from the uncertaint i e s  that 
attend the mortgage decision. One such answer may run l ike 
thi s :  a person de ciding whether t o  make a present sal e  o f  his 
property can know what affect on his l ife being without the goods at 
i s sue will have; more accurately, he can know this a s  wel l as he can 
know most things about himsel f. The de cision to mortgage , in 
contrast, requires a person to predict the effect on his l ife of the 
l a ter forceabl e removal of many of his po s se ssions or a significant 
few. The experience of repo sse ssion, however, may be incommensurable, 
in the sense that one must experience it to know it. In consequence, 
pe opl e cannot adequately asse s s  the threat to their autonomy that 
mortgage s po se . To permit an unregulated right to mor tgage thus is to 
cause persons heedl e s sly to imperil their autonomy by putting their 
po sse ssions at risk. 
This j ust ification for l imiting the abil ity to mortgage rest s 
on a factual premise that is difficult to eval ua te .  If pe opl e have no 
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appreci ation at all of the consequence s of giving se curity, regul ating 
or prohibiting it i s  uncontroversial .  On the other hand, if people 
have as full an appreciation of what it means to mortgage as to se ll,  
mortgage s should be allowed. No one knows, however. what people 
actually understand or nee d  to under stand about the mortgage de cision, 
in the sense of understanding now at issue . When the ultimate 
que stion is factual but the fact s are very hard to get, it is often 
sensible to resolve the matter by considering the consequences of 
assigning to one or the other po sition the burden of persua sion. Part 
V next make s three argument s in support of the view that peopl e shoul d 
be al lowed to mortgage whatever they are al lowed to sel l ,  at l east 
until further fact s about the mortgage dec i s ion are developed. These 
argument s have a common theme, which is that the restrict ions on 
personal autonomy that seemingly flow from constricting peopl e ' s 
abil ity to transact are unacceptable unl ess the autonomy enhancing 
effect s of a l imited right to transact are plain. Because these 
l atter effect s are obscure in thi s . context, the property rights 
obj ections to l imiting securi ty that are discus sed here should f al l .  
Th e  f irst argument i s  that the uncertainties which attend the 
de ci sion to mortgage are not unique . Our society al lows people to 
make many de cisions that importantly affect their futures, such as 
where and at what to work, whom to marry. whether to have children, 
whether to be soldiers and where to l ive. Peopl e seem equally wel l 
equippe d to evaluate the potentially adverse consequence s to them of 
borrowing on the strength of a used car. Nor do these consequenc e s  
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appear graver than those peopl e face i n  other areas where autonomy is 
given scope . Until new fact s shatter the common sense intuition that 
the mortgage dec i sion is rel evantly similar to de cisions that people 
can now freely make, pe opl e should be allowed to mortgage . 
The second argument is concerned more directly with the 
potentially contr adictory effect s on autonomy that f l ow  from 
restrictions on the abil ity to transact . These restrictions could 
increase autonomy, in the sense of enabl ing pe opl e to keep a nec e s sary 
minimum of goods or a particularly important f ew, but the restrictions 
also could decrease autonomy by dimini shing the se t of transactions 
people can make . It is argued below that l imiting the abil ity to give 
security decreases the autonomy of poor persons. in this l atter sense, 
more than that of middl eclass persons. The autonomy enhancing effect 
of this regulation. however, is difficult to asse ss. When the 
aut onomy increasing effect of regul ation is uncl ear but its autonomy 
decreasing effect seems both cl ear and e specially burdensome to a 
group commonly thought most in nee d  of help, the regul ation i s  
pr emature. 
Respecting the effect that l imiting security has on poor 
persons, regul ation of the sort described above creates incentives for 
creditors to l end to be tter risks, raise interest rate s or shift to 
other forms of se curity. such as second mortgage s on home s. 70 This 
change in the mix of credit offerings constricts the abil ity of poor 
people to borrow more than it constricts the middl eclass. This i s  
because poor people are relatively bad credit risks , are l e ss abl e to 
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pay high interest rate s and seldom can offer second mortgage s. To 
show that regulation of thi s  sort has a differential effect on the 
poor' s autonomy, however, it is not enough to show that the l aw 
impo se s greater constraints on them. If freedom of contract pose s a 
greater threat to the poor' s autonomy than to the autonomy of others, 
corre spondingly greater restrictions on the poor' s abil ity to contract 
are nece ssary. 
Two ways to show that security po se s a pecul iar threat to the 
poor exist but nei ther seems persuasive. The f irst is to argue that 
the poor are l e s s  abl e  than others to make intel l igent choice s be tween 
ri sking garni shment or foreclosure ;  as a result, they will risk 
foreclosure too frequently. The few studie s  of the poor' s abil ity to 
conduct commercial transactions fail to support the conclusion that 
they have l e s s  compe tence than others to make de cisions of this 
sort. 71 Thus this argument is without persuasive factual support. 
The second way to show that security po se s a greater threat to the 
poor' s autonomy is to e stabl ish tha.t erroneous economic choices have 
graver consequenc e s  for them. In thi s  context, such an argument seems 
straightforward: the poor own fewer goods through which to real iz e 
themselves than do the middl eclass; hence, foreclosure pose s a greater 
threat to their autonomy. For this argument to succe ed, however, a 
theory must exi st relating the nature of a loss to its effect on 
aut onomy. No such theory is now available. 
To perceive the effect of thi s  absence, suppo se that a 
middl ecl ass person gives a second mortgage on his home to f inance 
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recreational expenditures. The debtor knows that he will have 
diff iculty in paying the debt when it is due, but expect s to ref inance 
it on the strength of appr eciation in his home ' s value. Instead, 
interest rates rise and housing price s fall,  in consequence of which 
the debtor defaul t s  and l o se s  his home. 72 The debtor has not only 
lost money but also social status, for he no l onger is a homeowner; he 
cannot real iz e  his l ife plan in the manner he had expe cted. Al so, he 
has l o st a place with which his "personhood" may have been bound up . 
Do losse s  of this sort pose l e s s  grave threats to personal autonomy 
than a poor person' s loss of particular household effect s, such as a 
television? It i s  diff icul t to derive an answer to thi s  que st ion from 
ei ther of the property theories discussed above. But if the rel ation 
between type of loss and autonomy is obs cur e, the cl aim that greater 
restr ictions on the poor' s abil ity to contract are necessary be cause 
unregulated contract po se s a greater threat to the poor' s autonomy 
cannot be sustained. Rather, what i s  left i s  the apparent fact that 
regulation l imiting se curity constrains the choic e s  of poor peopl e 
more than it constrains the choice s of middl eclass peopl e, even though 
no showing has been made that the poor' s autonomy is put more at r i sk 
by the mortgage de cision. To j ustify a rul e that make s things 
relatively wor se for poor people, the autonomy enhancing effect s of 
thi s  rul e for all should be plain. The illustration above, however, 
also apparently di sproves thi s ;  what is to be gained from restrict ing 
se curity, in terms of increase s in the abil ity of persons to l ead 
ful l er and more fre e l ives, is quite hazy. In consequence, regul ating 
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the mortgage de c i sion more heavily than other de cisions seems 
premature.  
The third argument in support of treating mortgages l ike sal e s  
i s  that whatever threat to autonomy foreclosure may pose should be 
deal t with in bankruptcy context s, if at al l .  This again i s  l argely 
because of the obs curity of the rel evant property theories.  The 
theory that j ustifies al lowing pe opl e to retain an i rreduc ible minimum 
of goods in order to l ead ful l and autonomous l ives i s  of l ittle help 
in spe cify ing the minimum in a concrete sense, partly be cause the 
m inimum varie s  as among persons. Also, the theory that protects 
"personal property" is unable to identify in a general sense what 
property fal l s  into thi s cl ass apart from a f ew paradigm cases. again 
because what is personal varie s  with peopl e ' s preferences.  
Restrictions on the taking of se curity thus will be both over and 
underinclusive; they wil l l eave particular pe opl e with too f ew or too 
many goods or goods of the wrong kinds. The degree of 
misspe cif ication cannot nov b e  asse �sed given the relatively primitive 
nature of the theories.  To be sure, doing some of the right thing 
often is preferable to doing nothing, but the i s sue is when the 
something should be done , The choice is to pur sue autonomy concerns 
in the context of bankruptcies, largely by exempting a ssets, or to 
pursue them prophylactically, by prohibiting contract s .  It was said 
above that giving a general answer to thi s  que stion requires a ful ler 
treatment than can be attempted here.  But when so l ittl e i s  known 
about the effect s-- in the rel evant moral sense--of restricting 
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contracting, it seems more appror . d. ;;. o.e because l e s s  intrusive to 
pursue the moral concerns discus sed here in the bankruptcy context, 
when f inancial disa ster has actually occurred. At l east then the l aw 
confront s people who pl ainly need help. 
To summarize, moral obj ectionz to security apparently fol l ow  
f r om  a concern for personal autonomy; people should be al l owed to 
retain a minimum of goods, or goods that have pecul iar significance to 
them, in order to l ead ful l  and autonomous l ives.  The que stion these 
obj ect ions pose, however, is not whether people should have rights to 
things against involuntary seizure but whether whatever rights they do 
have are al ienabl e .  Persons should b e  allowed to give purchase money 
se curity interest s because thi s form of security enables them to 
acquire the things in which their autonomy partly inheres. The case 
against security of other sorts must l ie in the suppo sed inabil ity of 
people to perceive fully the threat to their autonomy that mortgage s 
po se; for society' s moral intuitions seem untroubled by the right 
peopl e now have to sel l  property that they cannot fully l ien. The 
abil ity of persons to mortgage, however, should be treated as the 
abil ity to sel l  now is. This is because moral theories that rel ate 
aut onomy to the po sse ssion of things seem insuf f ic iently developed to 
j ust ify the actual interference w ith aut onomy that re stricting the 
abil ity to mortgage seemingly create s ,  
VI. CON<I.USION 
The abil ity of parties to consumer credit transactions to 
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contract for security intere st s in consumer goods has been 
signi f icantly limited in recent years, and further l imitat ions are 
commonly propo sed. Three j ustif ications for this regulation have been 
influential with decisio11111akers : ( i) creditors systematical ly fail to 
maximiz e the proceeds from the sale of repo sse ssed col lateral. thereby 
increasing the size of the def iciency judgment s that debtors must pay; 
( ii) reposses sion of consumer goods "de stroys value , "  in the sense 
that debtors l o se the difference b e tween the valuation they attach to 
the collateral and its used goods marke t price, with no corresponding 
gain be ing conferred on anyone ; ( ii i) repo sse ssion is not done to 
acquire the proceeds the col l ateral could bring but for in terrorem 
purpo se s. to coerce repayment . The current oppo sition to personal 
property security al so seems animated by moral concerns. in particular 
the bel ief that an untrammeled right to repossess will unduly erode 
the personal aut onomy of debtors by depriv ing them of property 
ne ce ssary for the l eading of full and autonomous l ives. 
Thi s paper has shown that . .  these j ustif ications cannot support 
l imiting the parties' ab il ity to contract for security. Creditors 
actual ly do have strong incent ives to maximiz e the value of 
repo sse ssed goods, and the sparse avail abl e evidence indicates that 
they do so. Repossessions either do not de stroy value at all or 
merely transfer it, thereby vitiating obj ect ions to it rest ing on the 
premises that it is wasteful or evidences disr espect for persons. In 
t errorem repo sse ssions occur much l e s s  frequently than is commonly 
supposed; nor are they morally offensive when their purpose and effect 
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are understood. And the property rights case against security. that 
i t s  use threatens personal autonomy, cannot sustain l imitations on the 
abil ity of informed and compe tent debtors to mortgage their property. 
The argument made here, however, doe s  not a ssert that personal 
property se curity should be unregulated. When particular consumers 
are uninformed or incompetent. for exampl e, traditional contract l aw 
reasons drawn from unconscionabil ity theory support refusing to 
enforce unpl easant aspe cts of ti,;, contracts they make . Of greater 
importance. "marke ts for contract terms" sometimes may not reach 
compe titive equil ibria be cause of the expense to consumers of 
acquiring information about their contract s; a good case for 
regulation often exists when informll �ion problems cause marke ts to 
behave badly. 73 Regul ation fol lowing from traditional 
unconscionabil ity theory or that is l ikely to cure information 
problems, however, differ s in form and effect from the restrict ions on 
security discussed here. 74 It is regulation of this latter type that 
i s  without coherrent j ustif ication and that shoul d not be used. 
Attention instead shoul d turn to the que stion whether contract s to 
grant security interests in consumer goods rai se problems similar to 
those thought to be rai sed by contr act s containing broad warranty 
disclaimers and the l ike . 
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APPENDIX 
The proof belOY general iz e s  the exampl e s  in the text to show 
that it always pays a creditor to maximiz e the proceeds of resale. 
The intuition underlying the proof is that a bird in the hand�the 
col lateral�is worth more than a bird in the bush�the chance of 
coll ecting a def iciency in ful l .  
D = Total unpaid debt 
M value of a maximizing resal e 
N = value of a nonmaximiz ing resale 
r = di scount rate for bankruptcy recovery ( S .12 on the 
dol l ar in the text) 
p = probabi l i ty of debtor insolvency 
Rm = creditor' s r ecovery when he maximiz e s  resal e value 
Rn = creditor ' s recovery when he does not maximiz e 
resale value 
D - M = Debt r emaining after a maximizing resale = A. 
D - N = Debt remaining after a nonmaximiz ing r esal e = B. 
If Rm > Rn• it pays to maximiz e. 
R = M + ( 1  m 
R = N + ( 1  n 
p) (A) + p ( r) (A) 
p) ( B) + p ( r) (B) 
Thus it w il l  always pay to maximiz e if M +  (1 - p) (A) + p ( r)A > N 
+ ( 1  - p) ( B) + p ( r)B. 
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Rearranging terms yields M - N > ( 1  - p) (B - A) + p ( r ) (B - A) . Now 
M - N = B - A because the difference between a maximizing and a 
nonmaximiz ing r esale is the difference be tween the value of the debt 
r emaining after a nonmaximiz ing resale and a maximiz ing resal e .  Let 
.M - N = X  B - A • 
The inequal ity then becomes X )  X( ( l  - p) + p ( r ) (X) ) .  The 
l ef t  hand s ide of this inequal ity always i s  l arger than the right hand 
s ide because, p and r be ing f ractions, the right hand side must always 
be l ess than X. Thus it is always the case that Rm > Rn; creditors 
always do be tter by maximiz ing. 
The right hand s ide of the inequal ity becomes smaller as p 
becomes l arger. This shows that the expected loss to the creditor 
from fail ing to maximiz e increase s with incr ease s in the probab il ity 
that the debtor will become insolvent . See text at note 47 , supra. 
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1 .  u. c. c. c. Section 5 .116 . The section appl ies to collateral that 
" i s  or may be claimed to be exempt from execution on a money 
j udgment under" state l aw. but not to purchase money security 
interests or automobil e s. 
2 .  See text at notes 20-24, infra. 
3 .  See, e . g. , "Consumer Credit In The Uni ted State s . "  Report Of The 
National Commission On Consumer Finance 27 ( 1972) . A purchase 
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money security interest is taken by a sel ler or l ender to se cure 
the debt the buyer incur s in making the purchase. Uniform 
Commercial Code Section 9-107 . 
4 .  See Schwartz. A Reexamination of Nonsub stantiye 
Unconsc ionab ility. 63 Yirginia Law Review 1 053 ( 1977) . The 
caveat respecting social util ity fol lows from the po ssibil ity 
that out siders to a contract may prefer that it not be made or 
made in a different form. In this c ircumstance ,  enforcing the 
contract as made reduc e s  the ut il ity of the out siders; depending 
on the relevant magnitude s. enforcement could actually diminish 
I' 
social util ity. This po s sibil ity seems remote as regards 
consumer contract s. Also, in consumer context s  the out siders 
de siring nonenforcement are l ikely to occupy social statuse s 
higher than those of the consumer parties. When this is so, 
nonenforcement increases the ut il ity of the relatively well off 
at the expense of the relatively worse off, which redistributes 
wealth in the wrong direction. See ,lg. at 1061-63 . 
5 .  See R. Noz ick, "Anarchy, State and Utopia" ( 197 ) ;  J. Mackie, 
"Ethic s : Inventing Right and Wrong" 10-11,116-17 ( 1977 ) . 
6 .  See Eisenberg. The Bargain Prbc iple and Its Limits, 95 Harvard 
Law Review 741 ( 1982 ) ; Schwartz, supra note 4 .  
7 .  See W il l iams v .  Walker-Thoma s Furni ture Co • •  198 A.2d 914 ( D . C. 
App. 1964) . Thi s paper use s the term "contract l aw rea sons" to 
70 
capture the notion that some l egal problems are best analyzed 
f rom an � ante or contract l aw perspective, where the primary 
concern i s  whether a se t of outcomes--e . g .  contract s--was 
generated by a normatively satisf actory process, rather than 
analyzed from an ex post perspective, where the primary concern 
is whether a se t of outcomes is i t se l f  satisfactory, de cided 
l argely independently of the process that generated it. In a 
more concrete sense, the term contract l aw reasons refers to 
reasons that would be grounds for refusing to enforce ac cording 
to such standard contract l aw doctrine s as unconscionabil ity. 
The reasons about to be considered as j ustif ications for the 
regulation described above f it uneasily, if at all,  into standard 
contract doctrine s, which may explain why consumer goods se curity 
problems seldom are analyzed in contract l aw terms. Ul timately. 
of course. there are only good or bad reasons for regulation. 
8 .  A third possible set of reasons that could j ustify restricting 
security has to do with the na ture of se cur ity general ly. 
Secured debt may sometimes have unde sirable distributional 
consequenc e s  or be a l e s s  efficient form of credit than unsecured 
deb t .  This third set o f  reasons now seems not w e l l  enough 
understood to j ustify regulation. See Schwartz, Security 
Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities; A Review of Current 
Theories, 1 0  Journal of Legal Studies 1 ( 1981 ) . 
9 .  U. C. C. Sections 9-504; 9-507 . 
7 1  
1 0 .  These three themes are discus sed i n  a n  interest ing and 
compr ehensive paper, Whitford, A Critique of the Consumer Credit 
Collect ion System, 1979 Wisconsin Law Review 1047 . 
11 . •consumer Credit in the United State s, •  supra note 3 ,  at 3 1. Of 
the four j ustif ica tions for regul ation l isted above, the f irst, 
that creditors systematica l ly fail to maximiz e the proceeds of 
repossessed collateral, seem ingly could be analyzed under the 
contract l aw doctrine of good faith; failur e  to maximiz e, that 
i s, could consti tute a viol ation of the creditor ' s duty to act in 
good faith. However, while a v iolation of the duty of good faith 
woul d be grounds for a defense to an action for a de f iciency, 
standard contract theory doe s  not provide that the po ssibil ity of 
violations of the duty can support a prophylact i c  ban on an 
entire cl ass of transactions. · The se cond j ustif ication 
apparently has no contract analogue. Nor doe s  the third, because 
the creditor' s exerci sing a contract right in order to col l ect a 
debt that is l egal ly ow ing apparently doe s  not consti tute 
economic duress. The fourth j ustification al so fal l s  w ithout 
contract l aw because contr act l aw is not concerned w ith the 
assignment of property rights but rather with the trade s that 
right holders are free to make . 
1 2 .  I t  i s  unnecessary to this paper ' s argument to decide whether 
consumers are ade -i1..:-. tely informed respecting the prices and terms 
that constitute credit contracts.  See text at not e s  6-8 , supra. 
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For a discus sion of h<>Y the state should make such de terminations 
and re spond to the existence of inadequa te information see 
Schwartz and W ilde, Intervening in Markets on the Bas is of 
Imperfect Infopnat ion: A Legal and Economic Analys is, 127 Jh.....l!.a. 
L, Rey, 630 . ( 1979) ; Schwartz and Wilde, Competitiye Equilibria in 
Markets for Heterogeneous Goods Under Imperfect lnfopnat ion: A 
Theoretical Analysis with Pol icy Implications, 12 Bell J ,  Econ, 
181 ( 1982 ) , 
13 , See Magnuson-Mo s s  Act, 15 U. S. C, sections 23 01-23 12( 197 6) , 
14 , Much of the argument made below al so appl ie s to state statutes 
that permit creditors to execute on property after a j udgment of 
default i s  r endered. Inde ed, execution l aws may be thought of as 
state suppl ied security terms, This paper focus e s  on consensual 
security interests be cause much regulatory attention has been 
devoted to them; readers can make the obvious conne ctions to 
execution l aws.  Those l aws, .�owever, regul ate reposse ssion sal e s  
18 , E . g  • •  Mercantile Financial Corp. v. Mil ler, 292 F ,  Supp, 
797 (E . D . Pa. ( 1968 ) ; Credit Bureau Metro, Inc, v. Mims, 119 Cal . 
Rptr. 622 ( Super, Ct.1975 ) ,  
1 9 .  UCCC Section 3 . 3  01 . 
2 0 .  UCCC S ection 5 ,103 . 
21 . UCCC Section 5 ,116 , 
22 . West ' s Ann, Cal if, Civil Code Section 181 2 .5 
23 . Rev. Code Wash, Ann. Section 62( A) Section 9-501( 1) . 
2 4 .  New Mexico Stats Section 5 0-15-7 ( 1) (1973 ) ,  Al abama, Arizona, 
Colorado, Idaho, Indiana ,  Kansas. Oaklahoma and Utah ban 
def ic i encies in sal e s  f inance cases when the price of goods i s  
l e s s  than a specified amount. usually s1 . ooo . [ ci tations] . 
Massachusetts, Maine, Oregon, West Virginia and Wisconsin have 
similar statutes, most of which apply al so to se cured l oans, 
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differently than does the Code and thus deserve independent [ c i tations] . 
study. 
15 . UCC section 9-507 ( 1 ) . 
16 . E. g • •  Wilmington Trust Co. v. Conner. 28 U. C. C. Rep 
900(Del . 1980 ) . 
17 . E. g • •  Mack Financial Corp. v. Scott. 6 06 P.2d 993 ( 1daho 1980) . 
25 . Propo sed Trade Regul ation Rul e ncredit Practice s, n 16 C . F . R. 
444 .2 ( a ) (4) . 
26 . Id. at 444 .2 ( a ) ( 7) . 
27 , These j ustif ications also support rel ated regul ation, As an 
exampl e, Sections 5 .110 and 5 ,111 of the UCCC accord cons11111ers a 
right to cur e defaul t s :  if a cons11111er is i n  def aul t for ten day s 
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for failure to make a payment , the creditor i s  required to send a 
notice of def aul t; the consumer then has twenty days to cure the 
defaul t. The creditor cannot foreclose dur ing the requisite 
thirty day period. Comment 3 to 5 .110 explains that the right to 
cure is meant to prevent exc e ssively prompt repo sse ssions. This 
seemingly sugge sts that creditors do be tter by repo s se ssing, 
se l l ing the goods for l e ss than their face value and suing for a 
def iciency. The f irst and most wel l known cl aim for thi s  view is 
Shuchman, Profit on Default; An Archiyal Study of Automob ile 
Reposse s s ion and Resale, 22 Stanford Law Review 20( 1969) . The 
right to cur e al so is j ustif ied, in the comment, as preserv ing 
the consumer' s abil ity to present defense s before repossession, · 
which is a maj or theme underlying the distaste for in terrorem 
repo sse ssions. See text at note s 5 9-60 ,  infra. 
28 . 8 Credit Pract ice �' Staff Report and Recommenda tion on Propo sed 
Trade Regul ation Rule 16 CFR Part 444 , Federal Trade Commission 
Bureau of Consumer Protection 288 ( footnote s  omitted) ( integers 
added) ( 1980 ) . 
2 9 .  Id. at 28 9 .  
3 0 .  Th e  S .12 figure i s  a very rough approximation. A wel l known 
early study reported that creditors recover approximately S .08 on 
the dol l ar in insolvency proceedings. See V .  Countryman and A. 
Kaufman, Commercial Law 170( 1971) . More recent studies show that 
in 1977 creditor s  received no money at all in 81 percent of 
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bankruptcy case s .  In cases i n  which asse t s  were distributed, 
general creditors rece ived 27 percent of the S229 mil l ion 
available for distribution--$61 ' 1ill ion--but more than Sl .1 
b il l ion of claims were discharzed. A cr editor suing for a 
def ici ency is a general creditor, and is unl ikely to do as wel l 
as S.12 on the dollar if the debtor doe s  go bankrupt. See V .  
Countryman, A .  Kaufman, z. Wiseman, Commercial Law Case s and 
Material s  250( 1982 ) . On the other hand, some def iciencies may be 
col l ected without bankruptcies. rrecovery percentage s reported by 
maj or creditors to the F.T. C. ranged from 6 percent to 25 percent 
of dif iciencies out standing but the f igure s  were ambiguous in 
some cases. See White, Consumer Repossess ions and Defic ienc ies:  
Ney Perspectives from New Data, Boston Uniyers ity Lay Review 
( forthcoming 1982 ) . The text ' s conclusions, as the appendix 
l ater shows, are not sensitive to the precise portion of the debt 
that creditors can recover in def ic iency actions. See text at 
pp. 62-63 . 
3 1 .  See text at pp. 66-6 7 ,  infra. 
3 2 .  The text suppo se s marginal co st to be constant per dollar 
coll ected; its conclusion is unl ikely to change if coll ection 
cost s increase with increa se s in the dollars creditors seek�in 
e conomic parlance, if the se cond derivative of the marginal cost 
curve is positive .  To see how marginal cost could increase in 
this way, consider f irst a creditor' s resale efforts. The 
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creditor might f ind i t  relatively easy to sell a repo sse s sed car 
for 80 percent of its "value , •  but have to put in considerable 
effort to convince a consmner to pay the ful l 100 percent . The 
marginal co st curve for coll ecting def ic iencies al so could 
increase with increase s in the dol l ars sought, for two reasons. 
First, suits for larger amount s are more l ikely to be seriously 
conte sted than suits for smaller amount s, and courts may al so 
require stronger showings when the consequenc e s  to consumers of 
l osing b ecome grave. Second, the cost of col l ecting j udgment s 
might increase with the size of the j udgment s; collecting the 
f irst 60 percent, that is, may be simple but col l ecting the rest 
difficul t because debtors will be l e ss cooperative, more l ikely 
to hide a s se t s  and so forth. The text ' s a s smnpt ion of constant 
marginal co st for both col l ection methods--resale and suit--is 
consistent with the standard observation that marginal co st is 
constant over wide range s of output . This note ' s  analysis 
sugge st s that, in forecl o sur e . �ontexts, the text ' s as smnption i s  
l e s s  l ikely t o  hold. But it al so shows that if marginal co st 
doe s  increase with increase s in the amounts of dollars creditors 
seek, the cost increase s will attend both collection methods. 
The text' s a s sumption of constant marginal co st thus seems 
unl ikely to bias the analysis, al though it would be helpful to 
have more information on creditor costs than now exists.  
33 . Creditors may be thought to have an incentive not to maximize 
resale proceeds in order to impo se a penalty on defaulting 
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debtors; the pena l ty would be the difference be tween the 
coll ateral ' s  fair marke t value and the l ower resale price the 
credi tor actually obtains. This pena l ty would be impo sed to 
deter defaul t s .  S e e  Part IV, infra, discussing in terrorem 
reposse ssions. For such a penal ty to be effective, debtors would 
have to know both that creditors w il l  fail to maximiz e, and the 
consequenc e s  to debtors of this failur e .  I f  debtors were thi s  
informed about po ssibl e  creditor post-default strategies when 
they initially bought credit, however, they could cause creditors 
to face the choice of abandoning unfair strate gies or l o sing 
busine s s .  Thi s paper plausibly assmnes a lower l evel o f  debtor 
knowledge . See text at note 1 2 ,  .l!!l!.!'.!• A consequence of this 
assumption is to render ineffective a creditor strategy of not 
maximizing in order to penal iz e and thereby deter def aul ts. 
Also, creditors should be reluctant to make expl icit the 
intention not maximiz e, for this would be to admit openly to an 
il l egal practice. 
34. For claims in thi s regard, see ..£•..!.• • • credit Practice s, N supra 
note 25 , at 275-8 7 , 3 17-18; Comment, Default ing Debtors and the 
Jud icial Proc ess--The FTC' s Imposed Restriction on Defic iency 
Judgments :  sect ion 444 .2 ( c) (7) of the Rule on Credit Pract ices, 8 
Connec t icut Law Review 457 ( 1976) ; Note, I Can Get It For You 
Who lesale: The Lingering Problem of Automob ile Deficiency 
Judgment s, 27 Stanford Law Review 1 081 ( 1979) . 
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3 5 . See text at note 26 , supra . White .  supra note 3 0 ,  propo se s  that 
the retail price should be presumptive evidence of the maximiz ing 
price; creditors could r ebut the presumption "by e stabl ishing 
suitable facts concerning the condition of the repo sse ssed 
vehicle or unique marke t circumstanc e s . •  Two state s have adopted 
l imited versions of the rul e requiring f irms to credit consumers 
w ith the retail pr ice . Florida Statut e s  Annotated Section 
516 .3 1 ( 3 )  ( appl ies only to l icensed small loan companie s ) ;  
Connecticut, C. G. S . A. section 42-98 ( g )  ( retail value i s  an 
important el ement in determining the " fair marke t value" that 
f irms must credit against def iciencies) . 
3 6 .  The FIC, proceeding by adj udication, recently held that an 
automobile dealer committed an unfair trade practice by charging 
indirect expense s such as overhead and l o st prof its to consumers 
who had def aul ted and whose cars were repo sse ssed. It was 
industry practice to make such charge s .  Ou. appeal. the Ninth 
Circuit reversed without reaching the meri ts, holding that the 
rule developed by the FIC "Till have general appl ication" because 
"credit practice s similar to those of the dealer are wide spread 
in the car de alership industry, • and therefore the FIC had to 
proceed by rulemaking; it could not create such a w idespread rul e 
through adj udication. Ford Motor Co. v. FIC. 654 F.2d 
599 , 6 01 ( 9th Cir. 1981 ) . The j ustification for al low ing 
retail ing banks or deal ers to recover profit and overhead is 
identical to the j ustif ication f or al l owing sellers to recover 
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these items under section 2-708 (2) o f  the UCC. Creditors invest 
resource s in creating facil ities to retail used goods; if they 
cannot recover the resul tant capital and f ixed cost s  (prof it and 
overhead) , they wil l not be put in the po sition they would have 
been had debtors performed. 
3 7 .  Many creditors testified before the FIC that they made Thol esal e 
sal e s  because they preferred to l end rather than sel l  cars. See 
"Credit Practice s, •  supra note 28 . at 289-90 . The FIC staff said 
of this pol icy that i t  "reflect s the fact that higher returns are 
available to the creditor Then resource s are devoted to 
activ iti e s  other than U. C. C. sa l e s, •  but the staff bel ieved that 
this appl ication of the prin� :�le of comparative advantage 
inj ured consumers. ,!g. at 290-91 . The text next shows that this 
bel ief is f al se .  
3 8 . In a recourse f inancing arrangement, the dealer extends purchase 
money credit to the consumer and sel l s  the consumer' s obl igation 
to a f inancer. If the consumer defaul t s, the dealer is 
responsibl e  for col lecting the debt; thus the dealer commonly 
repo sse sse s and resel l s  the col l ateral . 
3 9 .  Section 9-504( 3 )  of the UCC requires a creditor to give the 
debtor notice of a repo sse ssion sule. and section 9-506 g ives the 
debtor a right to redeem the collateral by paying the debt in 
full plus the creditor' s expense s. If a creditor propo se s to 
se l l  the col l ateral for much l e s s  than its value , the debtor, in 
8 0  
theory, could ref inance o n  the strength o f  i t s  actlllll value and 
redeem. Th.us both versions of the cartel expl anation must 
presuppo se the ineff icacy of debtor redemption right s. 
Consistent with this presuppo sition, defaul ting debtors seldom 
redeem; the caus e s  of this failure seem unclear. 
A third way in which creditors could do be tter by not 
maximizing would be for them to buy at their own repo sse ssion 
sal es. Using the figure s  in the exampl e above, suppose that the 
credi tor repo s se s sed a car worth S3 ,000 when the debt was S5 ,000 , 
8 sold" the car to himsel f  for Sl ,500 , and sue d  for a S3 ,500 
def iciency; the creditor later sold the car to another for 
S3 , 000 . The creditor would do be tter than if he initially had 
sold the car for S3 ,000 be cause whil e ·  in both case s he recovers 
the car' s actual value , in the l atter ca se he could c laim only a 
S2 , 000 def iciency. Creditors sometimes do buy at their own 
repo sse s sion sal es, but the evidence fai l s  to show that they 
cl aim def iciencies greater than those cl aimed by creditors who do 
not. Perhaps this is because courts will scrutiniz e more 
carefully sal e s  to one sel f  and because a debtor could so easily 
show bad faith in these ca ses; a comparison of the sal e to 
one se l f  with the sale to others would general ly suffice . In thi s 
conne ction, section 9-507 of the UCC, which creates a sta tutory 
penal ty for noncompl iance with Article 9 ,  seems l e s s  toothl ess 
than i s  commonly supposed. As an exampl e, in one ca se the amount 
f inanced on a car was S5 ,938 .67 and the finance charge was 
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Sl ,3 63 .51 . On defaul t, the creditor resold the car w ithout 
giv ing the debtor the · sta tutory notice and sued for a def ic iency 
of Sl ,392 . 6 1 .  The debtor, representing himsel f, succe s sfully 
cl aimed that the failure to give not ice invoked the 9-507 
penal ty; that this penalty amounted to Sl ,95 7 .37 ;  and that the 
def iciency cl aim thus was wiped out . See Garza v. Braz os County 
Federal Credit Union, 608 S.W.2d 298 ( Tex. Civ. App. 1980) . 
40 . See, e . g . , • consumer Credit in the United State s, • supra note 3 ,  
at 3 1 .  
41 . A good analysis o f  the factor s  seemingly conducive to col lusi on 
i s  found in F. Sherer, H industrial Marke t Structure and Economic 
Performance" 199-227 ( 1980 ) . See a l so Kuhlman, Nature and 
Significance of Price Fixing Rings, 2 Ant itrust Law and Economic s 
Reyiew 69( 1969) . The analysis above ignores two factor s  commonly 
discus sed in conne ction w ith cartel s, the effect on the 
l ikel ihood of cartel behav ior of the abi l ity of f i:cns to innovate 
and of decl ine s in demand for the industry' s product .  See 
Sherer, supra, Kuhlman, supl: ·: ; �almer, Some Economic Conditions 
Conduc iye to Collus ion, 6 Journal of Economic Studies 29( 1972) . 
These factors are ignored here because potential cartel members 
are retail de alers and thus have a l imited ability to innovate, 
and because the proponent s of th ' failur e  to maximiz e 
j ustification apparently asser·': its appl icabil ity under all 
marke t conditions . The factors the text does discuss must be 
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regarded as tentatively val id because they are based primarily on 
studies of cartel s  that have been prosecuted. Whether the se 
factor s  characterize al l firms or only those in the "prosecution 
prone" category is unknown, but the factors are the be st we have. 
See Asch and Seneca, Characteristics of Collusiye Firms• 23 
Journal of Industrial Economy 223 ( 1975 ) .  
42 . See authorities c ited in note 41 , supra. 
43 . See Sherer, supra note 41 , at 3 06-1 2 .  
44 . The FTC staff asserted that collusive practice s were common but 
that their "clande stine nature" made it " impossible to quantify 
their preval ence . •  A Cal ifornia bank did test ify t o  the 
Commission that it faced Hunduly depresse d  b idding• when making 
•remote di spo sitions" of col lateral . It avoided the problem by 
creating a " central ized ' Collateral Control Center . "' See "Credit 
Practices, • supra note 28 , at 292 . Apparently, no other 
f inanci al creditor testif ied respecting col lusive bidding. In 
very smal l towns, few enough de al ers may exist to make plausible 
their attempting to form a cartel ,  but as the test ifying bank' s 
experience shows, the regional natur e of used car marke ts make s 
the success of such cartel s unl ikely. 
45 . The FTC study indicated that Ford Motor Credit Company obtained 
82 percent of the whol e sal e book value, Bank of America obtained 
79 percent of whol e sale and Security Pac ific National Bank 
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recovered 77 .1 percent o f  whol e sale. See " Credit Practice s, • 
supra note 28 , at 266� 7 .  n.42 . The Stanford study showed that 
creditors in Alameda County, Cal ifornia, rece ived 84 percent of 
the whol esale book val ue .  See Note, supra note 3 4 ,  at 1085 . A 
study of repo s se ssions in Washington, D. C. , indicated that 
creditors obtained 81 percent of the whol esal e value .  See Note, 
Busine ss as Usual: An Empirical Study of Automob ile Defic iency 
Judgment Suits in the District of Columbia, 13 Connect icut Law 
� 5 11 , 5 16-21 ( 1971) . Professor Schuchman' s initial study of 
Hartford, Connecticut repo s se ssions revealed a 7 1  percent average 
and a 75 percent median recovery of whol esale val ue .  See 
Schuchman, supra note 27 , at 62� 7 .  
4 6 .  General Motors Acceptance Corporation reported to the FT C  that 
i t s  repo sse s se d  cars were in "good, • • fair, • •poor, " or "wrecked" 
condition. GMAC cl aimed to recover 94 .4 percent of whole sal e 
value on good cars and 8 0 .8 percent of whol e sale for fair car s. 
( •credit Pract ice s, • � note 28 at 3 0 0 . )  A recent study using 
FTC data reached approximately the same resul ts .  S e e  Schuchman, 
Condit ion and Yalue of Reposse ssed Automob iles, 21 William and 
Mary Law Review 15 ( 1979) . 
47 . Firms with different co st structures sometimes do agree on a 
cartel price . Widely varying cost structur e s  make agreement 
difficult, however, because f irms have an incentive to 
misrepresent their cost s, and oc�erving individual firm 
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production functions i s  expensive for out siders to do. Potential 
members of dealer trading carte l s  have incentive s to misrepresent 
their cost s and their bad debt experience, both of which are 
costly for out siders to observe. 
48 . One study repor ted that def iciencies were no l arger than usual 
when f inancers resold to dealers pursuant to recourse 
arrangements and the dealers then sued the debtors.  See Comment , 
Defaulting Debtors and the Jud icial Proce s s, supra note 3 4 .  
Another study showed that def iciencies were l ower i n  this 
circumstance . See Schuchman, supra note 25 , at 40 . 
4 9 .  Th e  difficulties discussed above r espe cting de al er trading 
carte l s  se emingly could be avoided by secret side payment s. For 
exampl e, if the dealer in the f irst illustration in Part IA sold 
the S3 ,000 car for Sl,500 and sued for a S3 ,500 def iciency, but 
l ater received a secret SSOO side payment from the se cond dealer, 
he would do S236 b e tter than if he sold the car for S3 , 000 . No 
cartel would be neces sary; rather the marke t would have 
repo sse ssing dealers offering cars for l e ss than their actual 
value to whoever would make the highest side payment s. In the 
l imit, the side payment would equal the difference be tween the 
maximiz ing and nonmaximiz ing price (Sl , 5 00 in the text' s 
exampl e ) . But if thi s  is so, the side payment s would actual ly 
run the other way; the first dealer would sell the car for 
S3 , 000 , its actual price, less the sum the second dealer would 
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demand to cooperate in creating a bill of sal e that said 
"Sl , S OO .• Apparently no one bel ieves that such bl atant lying 
about the price s at which collateral is resold is common. This 
may be because lying woul d be relatively easy to de tect if the 
repossessing creditor reported the difference be tween the S3 ,000 
actually received and the Sl,500 c l aimed to be received in the 
def iciency action to its shareholders and on its tax r eturns. On 
the other hand, the failur e  to report this income is grounds for 
criminal sanctions. 
S O .  W and V are l ikely to differ because of income effec t s .  A 
consumer' s  demand for goods is partly a function of hi s weal th. 
If the right to keep particular goods on default is a "normal 
good, • a debtor would spend the same proportion of his income on 
this right regardl e s s  of how much he make s. Because a debtor 
without the right is poorer--by the value of the right�than a 
debtor with the right, a debtor without it would spend l e s s  of 
his income in dollars to purchase it than he woul d charge in 
dollars to give it up. Put simply, a debtor is richer if he owns 
the right and thus w il l  value the right more, .if the right is a 
normal good. The text a ssume s the right to keep the col lateral 
on defaul t to be a normal good, and so suppose s W, the ask price, 
to be greater than V, the bid price . Income effects are commonly 
used to expl ain differenc e s  in bid and a sk price s .  I f  the right 
to keep the goods were an " inferior good, • a consumer would spend 
a l arger proportion of his income on it if he were poorer. In 
8 6  
this circumstance, V actually could exceed W. 
Sl . Another form of the value de struction claim that i s  sometimes 
made i s  that consumers l o se the goods' repl acement value whil e 
creditors recover only the used goods marke t price . If 
repl acement value is conceived of as this used goods' marke t 
price, this form of the claim adds nothing to what has been said; 
the consumer can replace his used goods with other used goods, 
paying P, and so l ose s V P. If replacement value is conceived 
of as the new goods price, this version of the claim is fal se . 
Consumers default when the value to them of retaining the goods 
is l e s s  than the unpa id price (D > V) .  Since the new goods price 
must exceed D. consumers would not buy new goods and so would not 
l ose the new goods repl acement value .  
S 2 .  Thi s cl aim i s  commonly made . See " Credit Practice s, • supra note 
28 , at 227 , 3 21 and authorities cited in note 189, .isl· See also 
Whitford, supra note 1 0 .  
S3 . This argument is drawn from Akerlof. The Market for "Lemons• : 
Qualitative Unc ertainty and the Market Mechanism. 8 4  Quarterly 
Journal of Economic s, 488 ( 1970) . For a recent treatment of the 
theory, se e W il son. The Nature of Equilibrium in Markets with 
Adverse Select ion. 11 Bell Journal of Economic s 1 08 ( 1980) . 
S 4 .  The probl em could al so be l e s s  serious than is commonly supposed 
if debtors were more l ikely to defaul t when they own bad cars. 
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Commentators sometimes attribn� the value loss debtors may 
suffer to the absence· of wel l developed marke ts for used goods 
( see authoriti e s  cited note S 2 ,  .§.!!l!!.!) but the all eged absence of 
such marke ts is not expl ained. A marke t for private goods could 
fail to arise for supply side rea sons, such as barriers to entry, 
or demand s ide reasons. such as consumers' unwill ingne ss to pay 
enough to have the product be prouuced. Supply side obstacles to 
the formation of used goods marke ts seem sl ight, for entry into 
retail marke ts is relatively cheap. The text discus ses two 
demand side obstacl es. that consumers want only to purchase 
"newne ss" and that information asymmetries may make consumers 
reluctant to purchase . Neither obstacle seems serious enough to 
support the value destruction claim. Al so. casual observation 
seems inconsistent with the commentator s '  bel ief . At l ea st in 
cities, consumer durables can commonly be purchased used, which 
sugge st s the existence of viable used goods marke ts. 
SS . Profe ssor Leff first made this claim. See Leff, Injury, 
Ignorance and Spit�: The Dynamic s of Coerciye Collection, 8 0  Yale 
Law Journal 1 ( 1970) . 
S 6 .  This observation i s  more true o f  purchase money security than of 
se curity interest s that l enders take in their debtors' existing 
posse ssions. for some of these po ssesssions will not be new. 
S 7 .  For an argument al ong these l ines, see Wal lace. The Logic of 
Consumer Credit Reform. 82 Yale !&JI: Journal 461(197 3 ) . 
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58 . Income execution--i . e .  garni shment--has higher procedural costs 
than private repo sse s sion because courts are involved. Also, 
income execution can be more co stly than repo sse ssion because 
l arge claims may take l onger to recover. This del ay impo se s two 
sorts of co st s :  ( i) I f  creditors earn more w ith money than the 
l egal rate of interest. del ay creates opportunity cost lo sse s; 
( ii) Delay al so increases the l ikel ihood that debtors will go 
bankrupt and thus erase part (or all) of the debt . In addition, 
al though it is unlawful for an employer to dismiss an employee 
whose wage s have been garnished only once, employers are commonly 
bel ieved often to dismiss or otherwise sanction garnished 
employees. This i s  a cost pecul iar to income execution. 
5 9 .  A typical statement o f  thi s v iew asserts that nonpurchase money 
se curity interest s " equip a creditor with a capacity to threaten 
the consumer with extreme deprivation to induce the consumer to 
acquiesce to the creditor' s demands whether or not the demands 
are reasonabl e . •  • credit Practice s, • supra note 28 , at 193-94 . 
See al so id at 21 0-11; J. Spanogle and R. Rohner, H Consumer Law 
Case s and Material s" 328 ( 1979) ; Whitford, .!.!!:P.£A note 1 0 .  
6 0 .  Th e  constitutional requirements are described i n  Mitchell v .  W. 
T. Grant Co • •  416 U. S.  600( 1974) . A hearing is not 
consti tutionally required when the creditor repo s se sse s pursuant 
to a Code se curity interest. E. g . , Adams v. Southern Cal iforni a 
First National Bank, 492 F.2d 324( 9th Cir.1973) , cert. denied 41 9 
8 9  
U. S. 1006 ( 1974) . See al so Flagg Bro s • •  Inc. v. Brooks, 43 6 U. S. 
199( 1978 ) . The Model Consumer Credit Act (197 3 ) , draf ted by the 
National Consumer Law Center, rtG'.'ires repo sse ssion to be by 
action, sect ion 7 .202, but no state has adopted thi s statute.  
Wisconsin has come cl o se ,  requiring r epos se s sion to be by action 
unl ess " the customer has surrende red the col l ateral . •Wisconsin 
Consumer Act Section 425 .206 ( 1) (b ) ( l973 ) . A surrender " is not . 
• •  voluntary'' if it is "made pur suant to" the creditor ' s 
"reque st or demand" or "pursuant to a threat, statement or notice 
by the • • •  [creditor] that [ it] • •  intends to take 
po ssession of the coll ateral . •  Id. at Section 425 .204( 3 ) . The 
text doe s  not advocate hearings prior to repo sse ssion but only 
argue s that if reasons exist to make. tenabl e  a bel ief that 
threats to repossess often cause consumers to forego l egal 
defenses, the appropriate remedy is a hearing, not the regul ation 
of security. A maj or debate took pl ace in the 197 0 s  over whether 
a hearing should be const itutionally required when creditors 
attached goods pursuant to state statute.  Opponents of the 
requirement argued that debtors seldom had good defense s and that 
hearings would be exce ssively co stly; proponents disputed both 
assertions and cl aimed that consumers had a digna tary interest 
that unregul ated attachment could v iolate . A representative 
exchange is Johnson, Denial of Self-help Repossessions: An 
Economic Analys is, 47 Southern California Law Reyiew, 8 2 ( 197 3 ) ;  
Dauer and G ilhool, The Economics of Constitutionalized 
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Repossession: A Crit ique for Profes sor Johnson, and a Partial 
� • ..!,!. at 116; Johnson, A Response to Dauer and Gilhool: A 
Defense of Self-help Repossession, ..!,!. at 151 . See al so Scott, 
Constitutional Regulat ion of Provis ional Creditor Remedi es : The 
Cost of Procedural Due Proce ss, 6 1  Yirginia Lay Review 8 07 ( 1975) . 
6 1 .  See, e . g  • •  ncredit Practice s, • supra note 28 . at 23 6 .  
6 2 .  That unant icipated f inancial hardship should excuse defaul t i s  
considered i n  Wal lace, The Uses of Usury: Low Rate Ceilings 
Examined. 56 . BUL. Rev. 451 . 468-70 ( 197 6) . 
63 . See Radin. Cruel Punishment and Re spec t  for Persons: Super Due 
Process for Death. 53 Southern California Lay Reyiew 1143 ( 1980) . 
6 4 .  The l iterature supporting the reforms discussed here sel dom 
ex:pl icitly just i f ie s  them on di stributional grounds. but a 
di stributional theme may underl ie the case for regulation. If 
so. for two rel ated reasons th� theme is inappropriate . The 
supply of consumer credit probably is elastic in rel ation to the 
demand; that i s, credit suppl iers apparently can sell money in 
nonconsumer marke ts more conveniently than consumers. e special ly 
low income consumers, can forego deb t .  This be ing so. much of 
the cost of regul ation w ill be pa ssed on to debtors. in the form 
of higher price s, reduced credit availabil ity or less favored 
purchase terms .  The two reasons why this outcome is 
unsati sfactory are : First. because much of the cost is pa ssed 
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on, the resul tant redi stribution i s  l e s s  from creditors to 
debtors than among the debtors themselves. The defaul ters gain 
at the ex:pense of those who pay higher interest rate s or are 
denied credit. To the extent that default is within the control 
of debtors--persons can borrow wisely or otherwise manage their 
affairs appropriately--requiring " innocent" consumers to 
subs idiz e defaul ters seems difficult to j ust ify. Second, credit 
marke ts are bel ieved to se gment; the middle class and rich 
commonly buy and borrow from different fi:i:ms than the poor do. 
Thus wealth i s  11.�1l ikely to L: ' <>distributed across cl ass l ines. 
but rather within soci al classe s .  See Whitford, .!!ll!Dl note 1 0 .  
Poor consumers who pay higher interest rates o r  ar e  denied credit 
subs idiz e poor consumers who defaul t. This outcome seemingly 
taxe s the wrong group .  
65 . See Bankruptcy Refo:i:m Act of 1 97 8 .  11 u. s. c. Section 5 22 ( f) ;  
Section 1325 ( a ) ( 5 ) . 
66 . Legal analyse s of wel fare rights theorie s  are found in Grey, 
Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of 
Distributional Justice. 28 Stanfc, l Lay Reyiew 8 7 7 (  197 6 ) ; 
Michaelman, Welfare Rights in a Const itutional Democracy, 1 97 9  
Washington Law Quarterly 659 . 
6 7 . This second theory is set out in Radin, Property and Personhood, 
34 Stanford Law Review �-( 1982 ) . It has Hegel ian root s .  
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68 . Modern property theory recogniz e s  three source s of property 
rights, broadly speaking. One source derives from the Lockean 
notion that a person owns things in v irtue of his mixing his 
l abor w ith them; a second derives from util itarianism, holding 
that rights should be assigned in such fashion as to maximiz e 
ut il ity; and the third derives, in a more or l e ss immediate 
sense, from concern for individual personal ity, as signing r ights 
to people in such ways as to preserve or create their abil ity to 
be fully free .  This paper speaks only of the third source of 
property rights because the relevant l egal issue i s  when people 
can al ienate things .  Lockean theory seemingly assume s a 
virtua l ly untramelled right of al ienation; once one has acquired 
rights in a thing, by mixing one ' s l abor with it, nothing 
internal to the theory supports restricting the person' s power to 
exchange that thing for another. Util itariani sm al so supports a 
broad power to al ienate, espe cial ly if the modern view that 
pe opl e can best choose the act�ons that maximiz e their own 
util ity is accepted. For then, voluntary exchange s must be 
permitted, on the ground that they are made only when they 
maximiz e the util ity of the parties to them. In contrast to 
Lockean and ut ilitarian theories, an unrestrained power to 
al ienate could erode the basis of the property right itsel f when 
that right derives from notions of individual personal ity. This 
i s  because, as we wil l  see ,  persons could al iena te property 
ne cessary to their leading autonomous l ives or necessary to their 
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personhood. The support that personal ity theories of property 
may give to restraints on al ienation may partly expl ain why 
obj ections to freedom of contract in consumer context s sometimes 
have a wel fare rights tone . The text thus attempts to show that 
even personal ity theories cannot sustain present regulation of 
consumer goods se curity. 
6 9 .  See Hutchins v. Honeycutt, 286 N. C. 3 14 ,210 S . E.2d 254 ( 1974} . 
7 0 .  Th e  FI' C  staff said o f  i t s  propo sed rule banning se curity 
intere st s in household goods that it was "not [meant ] to prevent 
consumers from borrowing on the equity in their hcmie s, stocks and 
bonds . •  Credit Practices, supra note 28 , at 244 . 
7 1 .  See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1079-81 . 
72 . For stories l ike this, see • creatiye Financ ing• Come s Homes to 
Roost in Baniruptcy Court Los Angeles Times Part IV 1-2, December 
28 , 1981 . 
73 . See Schwartz and Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of 
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analys is, 127 
Uniyersity of Pennsylyania Law Re:I.i!J[ 630( 197 9} . 
7 4 .  These differences should not be overstated. For example, the 
most appropriate response to information problems is to require 
disclosure, but if the costs of disclosure are exce ssive an 
outright ban of a particular practice is occasionally the be st 
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solution. These case s, h01rever, are unl ikely to correspond 
c losely to the cases for regulation that have been developed from 
the four j ustif ications rej ected here, because information 
probl Clllls raise quite different i s sue s. 
The statutes criticized here may al so be thought of as 
provisions of a state suppl ied insurance contract; debtors pay 
higher interest rates but are " insured" against an unpl easant 
consequence that would otherwise attend default, tho consequence 
that is reposse s sion. Tho que stion then is whether the insurance 
contract is optimal . This l argely is a function of whether 
creditors are informed, an i s sue beyond the scope of this paper. 
In addition, if those statut e s  are regarded as an insur ance 
pol icy other questions arise . For example, do the statutes 
generate an unacceptable l evel of moral hazard, in the sense that 
they help cause an exc e ssive n11111ber of defaul ts? If these 
statutes were repealed, and if creditors had difficulty 
di stinguishing debtors l ikely to default frCllll those who are not, 
would 101r risk debtors have an incentive to grant exce ssively 
broad se curity interest s to creditors as a way of demonstrating 
their creditworthine s s ?  See Schwartz, ..il!J!.!:ll. note 8 ,  at 14-21 ; 
Rea, Amr-Breaking Consumer Credit and Personal Bankruptcy, 
Working Paper No. WSIV-10 ,  Law and Economics Workshop Series, 
University of Toronto ( 1982 ) . These que stions al so fal l within 
the se t of contr act l aw reasons excluded from discus sion here, 
but which are of considerable importance .  
